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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff-Appellee , 
vs. Case No- 920395-CA 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Jurisdiction of this matter is conferred by Section 
78-2a-3(2)(i). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Were the federal and state constitutional rights of 
Defendant violated by finding Defendant guilty of criminal 
contempt without (a) providing him proper notice of the charges 
against him and penalties he was facing; (b) advising him as to 
his right of assistance of counsel and appointment if he was 
indigent; (c) advising him of his right to remain silent, (d) 
conducting an evidentiary hearing where he could confront 
witnesses and to offer testimony on his own behalf, and (e) 
giving him other rights that are inherent in all criminal 
proceedings? This issue presents a question of law. State v. 
Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1991). As such, no 
particular deference to a trial court's decision is required. 
Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App. 1990). 
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2. As to civil contempt, were Appellant's federal and state 
constitutional rights violated in the proceeding below when the 
lower court failed to conduct an inquiry as to whether Appellant 
was indigent and if so failed to appoint counsel to represent 
him? This issue presents a question of law. State v. Gonzales, 
822 P.2d 1214 (Utah App. 1991), 
3. Since no evidentiary hearing was conducted, was there 
any evidence before the lower court to show beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the appellant had the ability to comply with the 
court's order and willfully failed to do so, thereby justifying 
criminal contempt? Was there any evidence before the lower court 
to show by clear and convincing evidence that the appellant had 
the present ability to purge himself of civil contempt and 
imprisonment by being able to make the required support payments? 
Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249 (Utah App. 1989). 
4. Did the lower court enter Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which are legally sufficient to impose 
criminal and civil contempt of court? This is a question of law 
for the court to decide de novo. State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 
1214 (Utah App. 1991). Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah 
App. 1990), Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162 (Utah 1988). 
5. Did the lower court violate Article 1, Section 16 of the 
Utah Constitution by imposing a jail sentence against Defendant 
amounting to imprisonment for debt? This is a question of law to 
be reviewed by the Court de novo. State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 
1214 (Utah App. 1991). Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah 
App. 1990). 
7. Did the lower court err in awarding attorneys' fee to 
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the plaintiff for litigation occurring before the Utah Supreme 
Court and United States Federal District Court when neither court 
specifically awarded such fees? §30-3-3, U.C.A.; Riche v. Riche, 
784 P.2d 465 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Gonzales, 822 P.2d 1214 
(Utah App. 1991). Carpet Barn v. State, 786 P.2d 770 (Utah App. 
1990). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions are 
contained in the Addendum to this Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal from the order of the Honorable Judge 
Homer F. Wilkinson finding Defendant in contempt of court 
thereby causing Defendant's incarceration for thirty days in the 
Salt Lake County jail. It is also an appeal from the order of 
Judge Wilkinson upon remand awarding attorneys' fees to the 
plaintiff as to litigation in the Utah Supreme Court and the 
Federal District Court of Utah. 
Course of Proceedings and Statement of Facts 
Because this appeal centers around the court proceedings 
below, the underlying facts of this divorce action serve only as 
background to this appeal. References will be made to the record 
number of both pleadings and transcripts. For those instances 
where no record number is available, the date of transcript and 
page number will be utilized or a description of the document's 
location will be given. Relevant documents which are not 
contained in the District Court file but which are contained in 
the file of the Utah Supreme Court, or the United States Federal 
District Court will be contained in the Addendum. Finally, all 
matters dealing with contempt will be underlined. 
The plaintiff and defendant were married on August 26, 1974 
and separated on December 26, 1987. The parties had four 
children during their marriage. On December 30, 1987 Jeannette 
Osguthorpe filed a Verified Complaint for Divorce before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson. (R. 2). During the preliminary 
proceedings the 1986 joint federal and state income tax forms 
were entered into the record. (R. 36-48). These documents 
showed that the adjusted gross income including wages, interest 
and rental income from both parties totalled $17,371.00. (R. 
34). Prior to trial the defendant filed a financial declaration 
under oath stating that his total monthly income as of 1988 was 
$2,350.00. (R. 80-88). 
During the lower court proceedings of divorce, Defendant was 
represented by attorney David Dolowitz. (R. 63-68). On August 
16, 1988 a trial was held before the Honorable Homer Wilkinson. 
During the trial the 1982 through 1987 joint income tax returns 
of the parties were received into evidence. (R. 157). At the 
conclusion of the trial the court awarded custody of the children 
to the plaintiff subject to reasonable visitation by the 
defendant. The court ordered Defendant to pay $150.00 support 
per month per child and $150.00 alimony per month for a period of 
five years, then $1.00 per year for the next five years. The 
court also made various orders concerning health insurance and 
personal property. (R. 159). 
Fewer than four months after the divorce trial, Plaintiff 
filed a Verified Motion for Order to Show Cause and sought an 
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order of the court finding Defendant in contempt, (R. 176-180). 
Shortly thereafter, the attorney for defendant's attorney filed a 
motion for contempt against Plaintiff's attorney on the basis 
that he had willfully failed to prepare written Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and a Divorce Decree in accordance with the 
bench ruling of the lower court. (R. 215-17). In addition, 
Defendant requested that Plaintiff be held in contempt for 
failure to abide by the previous bench order of the court. (R. 
218-223). 
Plaintiff's counsel subsequently prepared the required 
documents. On February 28, 1989 a hearing was held as to the 
objections lodged by defense counsel concerning these documents. 
(R. 250). The court essentially approved the Findings as written 
and executed them on February 28, 1989. (R. 251-67). Likewise, 
the Decree of Divorce was also executed. (R. 269-77). These 
Findings and Decree form the basis for subsequent actions of 
contempt which are the issue in this appeal. 
On March 1, 1989 the Domestic Commissioner executed an order 
ruling upon the separate motions for contempt filed by both 
parties. (R. 279-283). Neither party was found in contempt by 
the commissioner. On March 29, 1989 Defendant appealed to this 
Court various provisions of the divorce decree. (R. 286-87). 
On March 19, 1990 this Court affirmed all provisions of the 
divorce decree on the basis that the lower court had not abused 
its discretion. (R. 300-03; 131 Utah Adv. Rpt. 21; 791 P.2d 
895.) This Court affirmed the lower court's decision of alimony 
that the defendant had the ability to earn more than his present 
income and had chosen to be employed by his father at a lower 
salary. This Court also affirmed the lower court's finding that 
the federal and state tax returns appeared to understate the 
parties' income during the marriage. This Court stated: 
"The trial court found that defendant was not being 
candid as to his actual current income or was 
purposefully under-employed. We defer to the trial 
court's assessment of the credibility of the 
witnesses....Given the evidence in the record, it was 
well within the court's discretion to determine that 
Defendant was either earning more than the evidence 
indicated or had the ability to earn more money. 131 
Utah Adv. Rpt. at 23. 
Subsequently, on a petition for rehearing this Court awarded 
attorneys' fees and costs on appeal. This Court found, "Because 
those findings [of the lower court in the divorce action] are 
supported by the evidence we award Plaintiff her costs and 
reasonable attorneys' fees incurred on appeal and remand to the 
trial court for a determination of reasonable attorneys' fees 
Plaintiff has incurred on appeal." (134 Utah Adv. Rpt. at 23; R. 
299) . 
On October 17, 1990 Plaintiff filed a "Verified Motion for 
Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Determination of 
Attorneys' Fee on Appeal, Contempt Order and Sanctions and Other 
Relief." (R. 305-12). 
During all of these preceding events Defendant was still 
being represented by attorney David S. Dolowitz. On October 17, 
1990 Mr. Dolowitz filed a Withdrawal of Counsel. (R. 377). 
Concurrently, he also filed a Notice of Attorneys' Lien. (R. 
375-76). On November 1, 1990 Plaintiff's attorney sent to 
Defendant a "Notice to Appoint Successor Counsel." (R. 381). 
On November 20, 1990 a hearing was held before the Honorable 
Sandra Peuler, Domestic Relations Commissioner. Plaintiff was 
represented by attorney Kent Kasting and Defendant appeared pro 
se. (R. 402)• At that time Plaintiff was awarded a judgment of 
$22,538.00 consisting of delinquent child support, alimony, 
attorneys' fees,and costs of appeal. The commissioner certified 
to the judge the issue of Defendant's contempt and ordered an 
evidentiary hearing be set unless Defendant brought himself 
current through November prior to the evidentiary hearing. (R. 
402) . 
Defendant filed a pro se objection to the commissioner's 
recommendation claiming that he had insufficient income to pay 
the continuing obligation ordered by the court and had no assets 
available to pay the $22,000 amount required for the purging of 
contempt. (R. 404-08). He attached copies of his 1988 federal 
income tax return to his objection. (R. 410-26). This 
document, the federal tax return, showed an adjusted gross income 
of $11,933.00. 
On January 3, 1991 Commissioner Peuler affirmed her previous 
decision and executed an order to that effect. (R. 436-441). 
On January 25, 1991 the Court considered the objection to the 
Domestic Commissioner's recommendation. The Court made various 
orders regarding visitation, support, and personal property and 
in addition "reserved for an evidentiary hearing plaintiff's 
request for a finding of contempt, imposition of fine, sanctions, 
and jail sentence with plaintiff being allowed to schedule such a 
hearing in the future if she so desires." (R. 442; 449-55). 
(Emphasis added). 
On September 26, 1991 a new "Verified Motion for Judgment, 
Contempt Order and Sanctions and Other Relief" was filed by 
Plaintiff's attorney. (R. 466-71). In part, Plaintiff's 
pleading stated: 
Defendant's attitude of contempt for the orders of 
this Court throughout the history of this case, and 
since the November 1990 hearing, is blatant and 
shameless. Plaintiff requests the Court impose 
appropriate sanctions against Defendant, including but 
not limited to sentencing him to an appropriate term in 
the county jail for his contemptuous behavior. (R. 
470-71). (Emphasis added). 
On October 8, 1991 the motion of Plaintiff was heard. 
Again, plaintiff was represented by her attorney Kent Kasting and 
the defendant appeared pro se. The Commissioner recommended an 
award of an additional $6,750 for a period of December 1990 
through September 1991 of unpaid child support and alimony as 
well as recommending an evidentiary hearing as to the issue of 
contempt. (R. 484; 485-87). 
On October 18, 1991 Defendant filed objections to the 
domestic commissioner's recommendations. (R. 492-538). 
Included in the exhibits attached by Defendant was his 1990 
federal and state income tax returns. (R. 526-35). The 1990 
federal return showed an adjusted gross income of $11,167,00. 
On January 7, 1992 a hearing was held before the Honorable 
Homer Wilkinson concerning the matters previously raised by 
Plaintiff. Because this hearing and its subsequent orders are 
relevant to this appeal the hearing and orders will be discussed 
in some detail. 
On January 7, 1992 Plaintiff appeared in person and with her 
attorney, Kent Kasting. Defendant appeared in person pro se. 
Prior to any evidence being taken a discussion occurred between 
the court, Defendant, and Plaintiff's counsel. (R. 647-58). At 
no time during this preliminary procedure was Defendant advised 
of any criminal rights he may have or as to his right to have an 
attorney appointed if he could not afford one. 
During the hearing Plaintiff, Defendant, Plaintiff's 
attorney, Defendant's present wife, and Plaintiff's brother all 
testified. (R. 698-828). Defendant testified that he had 
insufficient financial income to keep current on his support and 
alimony obligation. (R. 757, 762-63, 778). Defendant's 1989 
and 1990 income tax returns were offered and received into 
evidence. (R. 785, Exs. 15 and 16). Defendant's new wife, 
Gwenda, also testified that her husband did not have sufficient 
income to meet the current support obligation. (R. 793). She 
stated, in addition, that the defendant was representing himself 
because they were unable to afford the services of an attorney. 
(R. 795). Defendant testified that he had insufficient income 
to pay for the past services of his own attorney Mr. Dolowitz and 
that a lien had been filed against him. In addition, he had 
insufficient income to pay the attorneys* fees for plaintiff. 
(R. 765-66). 
At the conclusion of the hearing the lower court made the 
following statement in rendering its opinion. This statement is 
quoted in its entirety because of its relevance to this appeal. 
The Court would also find that the defendant is in 
contempt of this court pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5), 
"disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process 
of the court." The Court would further find that the 
defendant has had an opportunity to have a hearing here 
in the courtroom, that evidence has been taken regarding 
the contempt, that his credibility is in question, he 
has not answered the questions put to him truthfully, 
that the only evidence the court has to go on is that no 
child support has been paid since February of 1991 and 
that time only 
* * * 
Well, you take the $375 that was paid, and of 
course none was paid in January, and going back to where 
he hadn't paid full child support back I guess to almost 
the time of the divorce, it looks like back in March of 
1989, that there is an amount of child support—and this 
would have to be determined accurately—but its up in 
the amount of $16,000. 
Now I'm not talking about alimony or attorneys' 
fees, I'm looking only at child support, and that he's 
had the means to pay this child support and that he's 
had a good education, he has the ability to, if he does 
not have the income—and the Court even questions that— 
that he is paying for rent in an excessive amount 
instead of paying his child support. 
The Court finds that this is one of the most 
flagrant violations of the law as far as support of 
children that has come before this Court, and as I say, 
I cannot even comprehend how a father can allow himself 
to do such a thing and still claim he loves his children 
and wants to visit the children. 
The Court would order, pursuant to Section 
78-32-10—and of course I've indicated he has been found 
in contempt—that he be fined $200 and that he be 
ordered to spend 30 days in the Salt Lake County jail. 
The Court would further order, pursuant to Section 
78-32-12 that the imprisonment is for his omission to 
perform an act enjoined by law, which he is yet in the 
power to pay, and that after serving the 30 days, he is 
to continue to serve the time in jail until he pays the 
child support as ordered by the court. 
* * * 
The Court would further order that the prison—or, 
the jail sentence be stayed for a period of six days or 
until the 13th day of January, 1992, that if the 
defendant, by that time, has paid the sum of $5,000 to 
the plaintiff for child support, then the sentence will 
be stayed and each month thereafter that he pays child 
support as ordered by the court, plus the sum of $300 
towards the arrearage—or for an amount of $900—then 
the jail term will be stayed. 
If he fails to pay the $5,000 by the 13th day of 
January, 1992 then he is to report to the Salt Lake 
County jail at 12:00 noon. If he does not report, a 
bench warrant will be issued for his arrest. 
* * * 
The alimony would have to be paid, too; I'm just 
not ordering that that be paid as far as the jail. He's 
in contempt of this Court as far as alimony and as far 
as the obligation of attorneys' fees and all the orders 
of this Court; and that should be noted for the record. 
But I am purging him of the contempt if he's paid 
the child support and gets the child support going, and 
what you do as far as the collection of alimony, I'll 
have to leave that to you. [Directed to Mr. Kasting]. 
(Transcript of January 7, 1992 entitled "Reporter's 
Partial Transcript of Hearing on Commissioner's 
Recommendation "Court's Ruling", pp. 9-13). (Emphasis 
added). 
The oral order of the court was reduced to a judgment on 
January 24, 1992. (R. 549-53). In addition, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law were also entered by the lower court. (R. 
555-63). 
In order to bring his support obligation more current and to 
avoid a charge of contempt, Defendant and his current wife 
applied for and received a loan from Valley Bank & Trust in the 
amount of $5,000 and paid this to the plaintiff before January 
13, 1992. Defendant then filed on February 21, 1992 a "Motion to 
Reconsider Judgment" on the basis that he did not have the income 
to pay the $900 a month imposed by the court and that now he was 
required to pay installment amounts on the $5,000 loan. (R. 
565). The Motion to Reconsider Judgment was denied by the court 
on April 3, 1992. (R. 586). 
Three months later on April 30, 1992 Plaintiff filed a new 
"Verified Motion for Judgment, Attorneys' Fee and Immediate 
Imposition of Jail Sentence." Plaintiff requested the immediate 
imposition of the thirty day jail sentence previously stayed by 
the court together with additional judgments for unpaid support 
and attorneys' fees. Plaintiff requested the following: 
Defendant has again willfully and intentionally 
violated the previous orders of this Court and, 
therefore, is once again in blatant contempt of this 
Court's previous orders and it is reasonable that he 
should be ordered to immediately commence serving the 
entire thirty-day jail sentence which the Court had 
earlier imposed upon him but stayed conditioned upon his 
complying with the payments the court required him to 
make to the plaintiff and the court should issue a bench 
warrant requiring the defendant to commence serving that 
jail sentence forthwith. (R. 590-91). (Emphasis 
added). 
On May 7, 1992 a Notice of Hearing of this Motion was filed. 
It stated the following: 
Please take notice that Plaintiff's Verified Motion 
for Judgment, Attorneys' Fees and Immediate Imposition 
of Jail Sentence will come on for hearing on the 18th 
day of May, 1992 at 9:00 a.m. before the Honorable Homer 
F. Wilkinson, Judge of the above-entitled court. (R. 
593). (Emphasis added). 
On May 18, 1992 Plaintiff's motion came before the lower 
court. Plaintiff was now represented by her new attorney, Sharon 
A. Donovan. Defendant once again appeared pro se. No attempt 
was made to conduct an evidentiary hearing. No effort was made 
to advise Defendant of any criminal rights nor was inquiry made 
concerning his financial status to hire an attorney. Concerning 
the appellant's ability to pay, Plaintiff's counsel made the 
following statement: 
He clearly has the ability to pay child support. 
I'm sure the court is aware of the Osguthorpe farm up in 
Park City, which part of it has been condemned in the 
newspaper recently, and they indicated that they 
received about $600,000—at least the family has—for 
the widening of the road into Park City and other 
property which is worth a couple of million dollars up 
there with the family properties. (R. 635). 
In another portion of the hearing, Plaintiff's counsel stated: 
And if Dr. Osguthorpe is only making $5.00 an hour, 
which I highly doubt given the amount of eduction he's 
had, given his family background, they own the 
veterinary clinic, they own property, he says he doesn't 
have an interest in it. (R. 643). 
Defendant informed the court that he had no interest in the 
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Osguthorpe family farm nor the income of his father. (R. 639). 
Moreover, he again asserted that his income as shown by his 
income tax returns was insufficient to pay the current amount of 
child support and alimony together with the past amount for 
arrearages. Defendant offered his 1991 tax returns to 
substantiate this claim. (R. 638, Ex. 2). 
Defendant then made the following statement: 
I'm doing the best I can with the income I have. I 
have no other source from which to draw and I wish I 
did. I wish I did have the income. But veterinary 
medicine is tough right now. It's going through tough 
economic times right now. I wish I could make more to 
bring this situation current, Your Honor. I've checked 
on other jobs in this area, and there are none available 
at this time, Your Honor. (R. 640). 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the following dialogue 
occurred: 
THE COURT: Please understand, Mr. Osguthorpe, I did let 
you know that you had the right to call witnesses; if 
you have any, or to have them take the stand, or to take 
the stand yourself and give any testimony. 
MR. OSGUTHROPE: I didn't know today that I could call 
witnesses, Your Honor. I thought this was just a motion 
to show cause. I'm not familiar—that familiar with the 
court system. 
THE COURT: You have a right to—in order to show cause, 
at which you have a right to bring any witnesses in to 
testify. (R. 645). 
The court sustained its previous order and structured the 
contempt of court identically to the January contempt. Defendant 
was ordered to serve thirty days in the Salt Lake County jail 
and, pursuant to Section 73-32-12, to a continuing sentence 
beyond that time in the event he did not comply with the child 
support and alimony requirements. The court stayed the order 
until May 26 at 12:00 noon at which time $2,000 had to be paid to 
the plaintiff. In addition, if the monthly $900 was not paid by 
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June 5, a bench warrant would be issued for his arrest* (Tr. 
May 18, 1992 at 2-4). After imposition of this sentence, 
Plaintiff asked, "Where am I going to come up with this income, 
Your Honor?" The Court replied, "Mr. Osguthorpe, payment of 
money is your responsibility which has been placed on you by this 
Court and by the Court of Appeals. As I indicated.to you before, 
I'm not telling you what to do. You do what you have to do." 
(Transcript of June 18, 1992, "Court's Ruling", p. 4). 
On June 11, 1992 Defendant's present appellate counsel 
entered his appearance for the Defendant. (R. 606) . Counsel 
was retained by Defendant's father because of his father's 
concern that his son would spend an indefinite term in the Salt 
Lake County jail under the court's orders. Subsequently, because 
of certain procedural irregularities, counsel for both parties 
stipulated that the May 18 order would be adjusted in order to 
give Defendant time to comply. Accordingly, the amount of 
payment was adjusted to $3,050 and Defendant was given until June 
24, 1992 at 12:00 noon in order to make the payment. (R. 
607-16). On June 5, 1992 a warrant and order of commitment was 
issued against the defendant. The order stated in part: 
Now, therefore, in obedience to an order of the 
court made and entered on the 5th day of June, 1992 you 
are commanded to take into your custody and commit to 
the Salt Lake County jail Jerry S. Osguthorpe and to 
confine him therein for a period of thirty days or until 
such time as he shall purge himself of this court's 
finding of contempt by fully cooperating with this 
court's previous orders.... (R. 617-18). (Emphasis 
added). 
On June 24, 1992 a Notice of Appeal as to the lower court's 
decision of contempt of June 19, 1992 was filed in the District 
Court. (R. 632). Subsequently, Petitioner filed a Motion for 
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Stay of Jail Sentence pending appeal with this Court. (See 
Addendum). Attached to this motion was an affidavit of Defendant 
stating that he had been representing himself throughout the 
lower court proceeding because he was financially unable to 
afford an attorney. In addition, he attached letters from Valley 
Bank stating that he could receive no further loans because of 
his poor credit, as well as three letters from other 
veterinarians relating to the current salary of contract 
veterinarians and stating that the veterinarian economic climate 
was poor. (See Addendum). 
On June 24, 1992 the Honorable Russell W. Bench of this 
Court entered a temporary stay order of the jail sentence pending 
a hearing on the merits before a panel of this Court. (See 
Addenum). On July 16, 1992 this Court heard oral argument 
concerning the motion for stay. The Court made the following 
order: 
It is hereby ordered that the Motion for Stay 
Pending Appeal is denied, and the temporary stay 
previously granted is vacated, based upon the court's 
determination that appellant has not sufficiently 
demonstrated that he would be likely to succeed on the 
merits of the appeal. See Jensen v. 
Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah App. 1987). 
and 
It is furthered ordered that the case is temporarily 
remanded to the trial court for determination and entry 
of an award of appellee's costs and attorneys' fees 
reasonably incurred in opposing the motion for stay. 
(See Addendum). 
On August 5, 1992 Defendant filed a Petition for 
Extraordinary Writ with the Utah Supreme Court requesting a 
review of the failure of the District Court and this Court to 
stay the imposition of the jail sentence pending final review on 
this appeal. On August 13, 1992 the attorney for Plaintiff filed 
a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in opposition to the 
issuance of a writ and concluded by stating, "Respondent 
respectfully requests that the Petition for Extraordinary Relief 
be denied, that no stay of the jail sentence be granted and that 
Respondent be awarded her attorneys' fees and court costs 
herein." (See Addendum). (Emphasis added). 
On August 17, 1992 a panel of the Utah Supreme Court heard 
oral argument concerning Defendant's Petition. On the same day a 
minute entry was entered stating, "In the absence of an adequate 
foundation the Petition for Extraordinary Writ is denied. In 
addition, the motion for a stay of execution is also denied." 
(See Addendum). 
On August 12, 1992 a second warrant and order of commitment 
was executed by the lower court. This warrant also directed the 
county sheriff to confine defendant for a period of thirty days 
or until such time "as he shall purge himself of this Court's 
finding of contempt by fully cooperating with this Court's 
previous orders relating to payment of the amount of $3,050 in 
delinquent child support and alimony through June of 1992." (See 
warrant contained in unnumbered pages of Vol. II of District 
Court Record). 
On August 27, Defendant surrendered himself to the Salt Lake 
County Sheriff. On this same date Defendant filed a Writ of 
Habeas Corpus in the Federal District Court of Utah claiming 
unlawful incarceration. (See Addendum). 
On August 31, 1992 Defendant's father D. A. Osguthorpe and 
Defendant's wife, Gwenda, paid $2,000 cash to the Salt Lake 
County Jail Clerk on the representation that such money would be 
utilized as bail to release Defendant from incarceration. 
Defendant was released that same day. On September 21, 1992 
Plaintiff filed a motion to transfer these funds to Plaintiff 
claiming that the money was properly hers and was not "bail". 
See Motion to Release Funds to Plaintiff and Affidavit of Sharon 
A. Donovan contained in Vol. II of District Court Pleadings 
unnumbered pages. 
On September 23, 1992 a hearing was held in the District 
Court concerning Plaintiff's motion for release of funds. At 
that time Defendant called Gwenda Osguthorpe and D.A. Osguthorpe 
who both testified that the $2,000 belonged to D.A. Osguthorpe 
and was posted upon the representation of the Salt Lake County 
Jail personnel that the money was to be used for bail and would 
be returned if Defendant attended all court hearings. (R. 
667-8_2) . 
During cross examination of Defendant's father, Dr. D.A. 
Osguthorpe, Plaintiff's counsel directly and frankly asked 
Defendant's father why he was not willing to pay the support 
obligation of his son. The following dialogue occurred: 
Q. The last question I have, Dr. Osguthorpe, is: you are 
quite emphathetic in your testimony that had you known 
that this $2,000 might have gone towards child support, 
you wouldn't have given them a dime. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Why do you feel so strongly about that, Dr. Osguthorpe? 
A. You have been irritating me for the past four years. I 
have omitted them from my will, and I was told that they 
were going to harrass me until they got every dime I've 
got, and I'll tell you that as far as I'm concerned, I 
have written them all out of my will. And just because 
I have a few dollars, it's no sign that I have to pick 
this up all the time, and I'm not going to. 
Q. I guess my question, and what I don't understand in this 
case, Dr. Osguthorpe, is why you feel so strongly about 
not helping your own grandchildren such as you would 
write them out of your will. Is there some vendetta 
against Jeannette or something of that nature? 
A. No, Jeannette's father was the sole cause of this whole 
divorce, and these kinds of people—they're too many 
good people in the world for me to spin my wheels with 
these kinds of people. 
Q. So no matter what, you're not going to do anything to 
help your grandchildren as far as helping to support 
them, correct? 
A. I'm not. (Tr. 681-82). 
At the conclusion of the hearing the lower court found 
factually that both D.A. Osguthorpe and Gwenda Osguthorpe 
believed that the money they were posting was for bail and that 
the confusion was caused by jail personnel. The Court noted that 
it had not set bail in the matter and that there was an error by 
the jail in accepting the money as bail. The Court then stated: 
Now the next question the Court has to face is: 
whose money was being used? The Court would find that 
the money was obtained by D.A. Osguthorpe, that it was 
presented, given, loaned to Gwenda Osguthorpe, and that 
she presented herself at the jail and paid the money to 
the jail for the bail. 
* * * 
The Court is of the opinion that the money was 
bail, but it was paid by Gwenda, that based on the 
payment by Gwenda, the Court would grant the motion to 
forfeit the bail. (R. 691). 
During this same hearing Defendant's counsel argued that the 
bench warrants issued by the court were ambiguous and not 
consistent with the original orders of contempt. Specifically, 
counsel argued that the original orders of the court in January 
and May required Defendant to serve a straight thirty days in 
jail plus any additional time until he complied with the monetary 
payment. The bench warrants, however, provided that he would be 
confined in jail for a period of thirty days or until such time 
as he made the payments. This wording created an ambituity which 
allowed the plaintiff to argue that the contempt was purely civil 
since it provided a thirty-day maximum sentence or sooner if he 
paid the reuired amount. Counsel stated he wanted this warrant 
corrected in order to correctly argue in the federal action the 
court's intent to utilize the criminal thirty-day statute. (R. 
694-95). 
The Court in denying the motion to modify the language of 
the warrant stated the following: 
Well, the Court has not reviewed these orders; of 
course I read them at the time, and I signed them, and I 
know that there was discussion as to that first one, 
whatever it was, I can't remember myself right now. But 
Mr. Cook was a participant in the discussion at that 
time. 
And the Court does not feel that the motion now is 
timely as far as changing any warrant. I would deny the 
motion. And when you talk about criminal contempt, this 
Court was not indicating in any way that it was a 
criminal proceeding here. This has been a civil action, 
and of course the contempt was a civil contempt under 
the law. (R. 696). (Emphasis added). 
As predicted, the County Attorney in his response to the 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus on September 25, 1992 pled as 
a defense that Petitioner was incarcerated solely for civil 
contempt based upon the language contained in the warrant. 
See Addendum. 
During this same period of time a third revised warrant and 
order of commitment was issued by the court in which the Salt 
Lake County Jail was ordered to confine Defendant for a period of 
thirty days or until such time "as he shall purge himself of this 
Court's finding of contempt by fully cooperating with this 
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Court's previous orders related to payment of the amount of 
$3,950•00." See unnumbered page contained in Vol. II of 
District Court file. 
On September 28, 1992 Plaintiff filed a Verified Motion for 
Judgment, Attorneys1 Fees and Other Related Matters. This motion 
was filed pursuant to the remand by this Court to determine 
attorneys' fees for Defendant's attempt to stay the sentence. In 
addition, however, Plaintiff sought attorneys' fees that she 
incurred in the Supreme Court action and in the Federal District 
Court action. See Motion and Affidavit of Sharon Donovan in 
unnumbered portion of Vol. II of lower court record. 
On October 1, 1992 Defendant was arrested outside of his 
home and taken to the Salt Lake County jail for further 
incarceration. 
On October 2, 1992 a hearing was held in the Federal 
District Court. Judge Bruce Jenkins granted the sheriff's motion 
for dismissal on the basis that Defendant should pursue a 
modification of the current support order in the state court and 
that appellate review of the contempt proceeding was still 
pending in the state system. The Order of Dismissal was executed 
on October 16, 1992. See Addendum. 
On October 6, 1992 Defendant filed a Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Release Funds to Plaintiff on 
the basis that the Court did not have authority to take the money 
of Dr. D.A. Osguthorpe which was posted for bail and to turn it 
over to Defendant's former wife. See Memorandum in unnumbered 
pages of Vol. II District Court Record. 
On October 9, 1992 a hearing was held concerning Plaintiff's 
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motion for judgment and attorneys1 fees. Plaintiff Jeanette 
Osguthorpe testified as to the amount which was delinquent since 
the last hearing. Defendant did not object to the computation of 
these amounts. He did, however, object to Plaintiff's request 
for $3,196.00 in attorneys' fees from the Utah Supreme Court on 
the basis that Plaintiff had requested attorneys' fees from the 
Utah Supreme Court but that they were not awarded. Likewise, he 
objected to the award of attorneys' fees incurred by Plaintiff in 
the federal habeas corpus action on the basis that she was not 
even a party and that it was not directly related to the divorce 
but was related to his incarceration. The Court made the 
following order: 
I think that the argument, of course, as to the 
merits was brought up by the defendant, but this Court 
is persuaded that the divorce statute, Title 30, as 
referred to, that it does put responsibility on this 
Court for the awarding of attorneys' fees in divorce 
actions. 
If the Supreme Court had denied, or the Federal 
Court had denied them, then there's no question this 
Court would not have acted. 
But I have seen—well, I shouldn't say "many"—I've 
seen cases where the Supreme Court has sent cases back 
for the award of attorneys' fees. I've seen cases in 
divorce actions where attorneys' fees are awarded where 
the Supreme Court has not made an actual award of them. 
So what I'm saying is this: I'm granting the 
plaintiff's motion as prayed for attorneys' fees. Of 
course I don't want to create more litigation; however, 
if either the Supreme Court or the Federal Court did 
take the position that they did not intend to have any 
attorneys' fees awarded, then of course that would 
override my order here today. Otherwise, they would be 
awarded. (October 9, 1992 hearing, p. 12). 
In the same proceeding Defendant's counsel made the 
following request: 
MR. COOK: And one more, then, also, Your Honor, we 
would like to have credit for the previous four days he 
was previously incarcerated when he was released 
erroneously as to this sentence, so that he can add that 
to the thirty days; so it's the same basic sentence. It 
is the same sentence; he was only released because of 
the error, and therefore we believe he should be 
credited for those four days. 
MS. DONOVAN: I think it was a new bench warrant. 
Whatever the Court thinks. 
THE COURT: What does the bench warrant say? 
MS. DONOVAN: Thirty days. 
MR. COOK: There were two separate bench warrants. 
MS. DONOVAN: Did you— 
MR. COOK: But they're both thirty days. 
MS. DONOVAN: Or earlier if you'll pay the money. 
THE COURT: Well I think he's entitled to any time 
that he served, the he would be entitled to that. If 
that's what the bench warrant is limited to, I would 
grant that. (Transcript October 9, 1992 hearing, p. 
14). (Emphasis added). 
On October 16, 1992 the lower court signed an order to 
credit the jail time thereby giving Defendant the four-day credit 
for his previous incarceration. See "Order to Credit Jail 
Time" contained in unnumbered pages of Vol. II of lower court 
record. 
On October 22, 1992 Plaintiff's counsel filed a "Motion for 
Order Extending Revised Warrant and Order of Commitment." The 
Affidavit of attorney Sharon Donovan filed in conjunction with 
such motion stated that she had learned that based upon the 
Court's earlier order allowing Defendant credit for time served 
that Defendant would be released on October 23, 1992 after 
serving 27 days in the county jail. The Affidavit stated, "Based 
upon the language of the prior revised warrant and order of 
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commitment, affiant respectfully requests that this Court extend 
the jail sentence, until Defendant fully complies with paying the 
$3,950 ordered by this Court." 
On October 22, 1992 the Court entered its "Ex Parte Order 
Extending Revised Warrant and Order of Commitment." The new order 
provided that the Salt Lake County Jail was ordered not to 
release Defendant "until he fully complies with paying the sum of 
$3,950 or until further order of this Court." See Ex Parte Order 
contained in Vol. Ii of unnumbered pages of District Court 
Record. 
As of October 23, 1992 Defendant had served 27 days in jail 
based upon the contempt proceeding and was entitled to release 
because of good time served. Once the Ex Parte Order was signed 
by the lower court, however, it was apparent that the previous 
representations made by Plaintiff and her attorney for purposes 
of defeating the claim of a criminal contempt argument were 
shifting mounds of sand. At this point, Defendant's father Dr. 
D.A. Osguthorpe, in spite of the Defendant's opposition, elected 
to pay an additional $1,950 to Plaintiff for his son's obligation 
and to forego any claim as to the previous $2,000 he had paid 
erroneously based on bail since otherwise his son would stay 
in jail indefinitely. See "Motion and Stipulation" contained in 
unnumbered pages of District Court Record Vol. II. Accordingly, 
on October 23, 1992 the lower court ordered Defendant released 
from custody and further ordered that the $2,000 being held in 
dispute be released to Plaintiff. 
Unbelievably, there have been no further procedural events 
since the time of Defendant's release on October 23 until the 
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time of the filing of this Brief approximately one month later. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. Even though this was a domestic lawsuit, Defendant was 
found guilty of criminal contempt and therefore was entitled to 
all of the procedural and substantive protections that criminal 
defendants are afforded. The failure to treat this matter as 
criminal constitutes clear reversible error. 
2. Because a finding of civil contempt can result in 
unlimited jail incarceration an accused defendant is entitled to 
assistance of counsel if he is indigent and unable to afford 
counsel. No such inquiry was made in the instant case thereby 
violating Defendant's due process rights. 
3. Before criminal contempt can be imposed upon a defendant 
the moving party must show beyond a reasonable doubt that a 
petitioner had the ability to comply with the court's order and 
has willfully failed to do so. In this case, no evidentiary 
hearing was held at all in May and therefore this burden was 
never even attempted to be met. For this reason there is no 
evidence in the record to justify Defendant's conviction for 
criminal contempt. 
4. Likewise, before being able to be convicted of civil 
contempt the moving party must show by clear and convincing 
evidence that a defendant has the present ability to purge 
himself by making the necessary required child support payments. 
Again, no evidentiary hearing at all was held in this matter and 
there is no evidentiary basis to believe that Defendant was able 
to meet the conditions of the court to be released from 
incarceration. 
-24-
5. Before a court can impose criminal or civil contempt it 
must make findings of fact and conclusions of law which are 
legally sufficient. In the instant case no such findings were 
ever made as to the May hearing which resulted in Defendant's 
imprisonment. For this reason, therefore, the incarceration was 
contrary to law. 
6. Article 1 Section 16 of the Utah Constitution prohibits 
imprisonment for debt. Since there was no showing in this case 
that the defendant was willfully refusing to pay his support 
obligations, his imprisonment clearly violated this section of 
the Utah Constitution. 
7. Utah divorce statutes allow courts to assess attorneys* 
fees in order to enable a party to prosecute or defend the 
divorce action. This statute does not authorize costs incurred 
in ancillary lawsuits not directly related to the divorce itself 
nor does it permit the District Court to assess attorneys' fees 
when such fees have not been granted by the higher courts. 
ARGUMENT 
Courts, lawyers, and clients are all familiar with the term 
"contempt of court." It is a concept which is utilized each day 
in our judicial system as a threat or as an actual punishment. 
It is therefore surprising that the technicalities of contempt 
are so little known by those who daily utilize it. Hopefully, 
the instant case and another case involving criminal contempt of 
a lawyer being decided by a panel of this Court (State v. 
Long, No. 910708) will help to educate the judges and lawyers of 
this State to better understand the requirements of this drastic 
remedy. 
Defendant will first examine the legal technicalities of 
criminal and civil contempt to demonstrate that this case 
involves both. Next, he will argue that his state and federal 
constitutional rights were clearly violated in the procedural 
aspects of both the criminal and civil contempt citations. 
Defendant will then review the evidentiary basis that is 
required before criminal and civil contempt can be imposed and 
will demonstrate that this case has no such basis. Furthermore, 
the lower court failed to make the required findings in order to 
justify any imposition of criminal and civil contempt. Defendant 
will next urge that without evidence of a willful failure to pay 
a support obligation imprisonment amounts to a Utah State 
constitutional violation of imprisonment for pure debt. 
Finally, Defendant will attack the award of attorneys* fees 
to Plaintiff concerning an extraordinary writ action brought 
before the Utah Supreme Court and an habeas corpus action brought 
before the Federal District Court. Defendant will demonstrate 
that such fees are not allowable under Utah statute and cannot be 
made by the District Court unless specifically ordered by the 
other ancillary courts. These items will not be addressed in 
serium. 
POINT I 
THE JANUARY AND MAY ORDERS OF THE LOWER 
COURT CONSTITUTE BOTH CRIMINAL, AND CIVIL 
CONTEMPT. 
During the September 23, 1992 hearing Judge Wilkinson made 
the following enlightening statement: 
And when you talk about criminal contempt, this 
Court was not indicating in any way that it was a 
criminal proceeding here. This has been a civil action, 
and of course the contempt was a civil contempt under 
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the law. (R. 696) . 
This statement says it all. The lower court simply did not 
understand that even in this clearly civil action he had imposed 
a criminal sentence against a defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 
1162 (Utah 1988) discussed in detail the law of contempt of 
court. The Court stated: 
The primary determinant of whether a particular 
contempt order is to be labeled civil or criminal is the 
trial court's purpose in entering the order....A 
contempt order is criminal if its purpose is to 
vindicate the court's authority, as by punishing an 
individual for disobeying an order, even if the order 
arises from civil proceedings....A contempt order is 
civil if it has a remedial purpose, either to coerce an 
individual to comply with a court order given for the 
benefit of another party, or to compensate an aggrieved 
party for injuries resulting from the failure to comply 
with an order. Id. at 1168. 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the United States 
Supreme Court decision of Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 
(1988) in which the distinction between criminal and civil 
contempt was outlined in terms of federal constitutional law. The 
Utah Supreme Court stated that it would adopt the Feiock 
approach as a matter of state law in the following manner: 
For all future cases, we will follow the rule that 
a contempt order is criminal if the fine or sentence 
imposed is fixed and unconditional, but is civil if the 
fine or imprisonment is conditional such that the 
contemner can obtain relief from the contempt order 
merely by doing some act as ordered by the court. 
Further, a contempt order is civil if the order is to 
pay a fine to the other party rather than to the court. 
759 P.2d 1168 at n.5. 
The Order of Contempt being appealed in this case eminated 
originally from the January 7, 1992 hearing. As quoted earlier, 
the Court relied upon Section 78-32-10 to fine Defendant $200 and 
to sentence him to thirty days in the Salt Lake County jail. 
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(Tr. at 10, January 7, 1992 hearing). In addition, relying upon 
Section 78-32-12 the Court stated, "that after serving the thirty 
days, he is to continue to serve time in jail until he pays the 
child support as ordered by the Court." Id. at 11. The written 
order and findings echoes this same scheme of contempt. (R. 
549-53; 555-63). Likewise, the May 18, 1992 hearing incorporated 
this prior contempt sentence and reapplied it once again. (Tr. 
May 18, 1992 at 2-4). The written order also repeated the 
criminal and civil contempt penalties. (R. 613-14). 
It is obvious, therefore, that the Court first sentenced 
Defendant to a criminal contempt charge of thirty days in the 
county jail plus a fine of $200. Second, the Court imposed a 
civil contempt penalty for unlimited additional jail time beyond 
the thirty days until Defendant purged himself by paying the 
delinquent amount. In both cases, however, the Court stayed 
these sentences to give the defendant ten days in which to pay 
the set amount required. Pursuant to the January order Defendant 
was able to borrow $5,000 and thus avoid incarceration. As to 
the second order in May, however, Defendant was unable to ever 
make this payment and it was only through the money of his father 
that Defendant was released from incarceration. Had his father 
not paid this required amount, there is no doubt in appellate 
counsel's mind that Defendant would still be incarcerated! 
The lower court together with many other judges and lawyers 
practicing in Utah erroneously believe that if a thirty-day jail 
sentence is stayed for a definite period of time to allow payment 
of a specified amount that the contempt is civil and not criminal 
since the defendant has the opportunity to "purge" himself before 
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going to jail. However, this reasoning is erroneous since the 
ability to purge must be present while incarcerated. Two cases 
from other jurisdictions which utilize the identical orders of 
this case were clearly found to constitute criminal contempt. 
Maddux v. Maddux, 475 N.W.2d 524 (Neb. 1991) the lower court 
gave the defendant a short period of time to come up with an 
amount in arrears. If he did not do so, like here, he was 
ordered to spend thirty days in the county jail. The Nebraska 
Supreme Court stated: 
The order ceased to be coercive on April 1, 1989 
because the jail sentence was no longer subject to 
mitigation. If the child support amounts due were not 
paid by April 1, 1989, Maddux was required to serve a 
punitive thirty-day sentence, regardless of whether the 
amounts were paid subsequent to that date. Maddux no 
longer would be "holding the keys to his jail cell" 
after April 1. An unconditional penalty is criminal in 
nature because it is "solely and exclusively punitive in 
character." Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 633 
(1988). Id. at 528. 
Likewise, in the case of In Re Marriage of Talmadge, 534 
N.E.2d 1356 (Ill.App. 1989) a similar order was entered by the 
lower court. The Illinois Court of Appeals stated: 
In the instant case, the order finding respondent 
in contempt sentenced him to thirty days in jail with 
said sentence to be stayed for a period of 45 days to 
allow respondent to purge himself by payment of 
$4,806.22 to petitioner. We find that this order was 
criminal in nature because, once respondent failed to 
pay within 45 days, he was to be incarcerated without 
any way to purge himself. See Hicks, 108 S.Ct. at 
1432. Thus, assuming that on remand, the trial court 
finds that petitioner did consult with respondent, 
respondent should be entitled to a new hearing using the 
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1363. 
The second phase of Judge Wilkinson's contempt order was 
clearly civil in nature. Civil contempt proceedings have two 
fundamental attributes: (1) the contemner must be capable of 
taking the action sought to be coerced and (2) no further 
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contempt sanctions are imposed upon the contemner's compliance 
with the pertinent court order. In other words, the contemner 
must have an opportunity to purge himself of contempt by 
complying with the pertinent court order. If the contempt 
sanction is incarceration, the defendant's circumstances should 
be such that he may correctly be viewed as possessing the "keys 
to his cell." Penfield Co. v. S.E.C, 330 U.S. 585, 590 (1947); 
Von Hake, supra, p. 1168. 
Under the civil contempt rule, a party can be held 
indefinitely in jail until such time as he complies with the 
court order. Thus, a civil contempt citation may carry a much 
greater penalty than a criminal citation. An important standard 
that must be considered in civil contempt cases, however, is that 
the person who is sentenced to prison or jail must be capable of 
purging himself at any time. As noted by the United States 
Supreme Court in Feiock, supra: 
Our precedents are clear, however, that punishment 
may not be imposed in a civil contempt proceeding when 
it is clearly established that the alleged contemner is 
unable to comply with the terms of the order. 485 U.S. 
at 638. 
See also, State Ex Rel N.A. v. G.S., 456 N.W.2d 867 
(Wis.App. 1990) (compliance with the purge provision must be 
within the power of the contemner); Maddux v. Maddux, 475 
N.W.2d 524 (Neb. 1991) (to be reasonable, the amount of money 
required to be paid for a contemner to purge himself or herself 
of contempt of court must be within the contemner's ability to 
pay) . 
The Supreme Court of Michigan and the Supreme Court of 
Florida have held that even though a contempt order is in the 
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nature of civil contempt, it immediately becomes criminal in 
nature if the defendant is unable to comply with its terms. In 
Sword v. Sword, 249 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. 1976), the court 
stated: 
If the defendant does not have the present ability 
to pay, then he does not have the "keys to the jail"; 
what is nominally a civil contempt proceeding is in fact 
a criminal proceeding—the defendant is not being 
coerced, but punished. Id. at 88. 
See also. Mead v. Batchelor, 460 N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 1990); 
Bowen v. Bowen, 471 S.2d 1274 (Fla. 1985). 
A final legal principle that should be noted in the criminal 
versus civil contempt comparison is that if both civil and 
criminal relief are imposed in the same proceeding, then the 
"criminal feature of the order is dominant and fixes its 
character for purposes of review." Nye v. United States, 313 U.S. 
33, 42-43 (1941); Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d at 1169. 
In addition to labeling a contempt of court either criminal 
or civil in nature, it is necessary to determine whether the 
contempt is direct, i.e., committed in the presence of the judge, 
or indirect, i.e., committed outside the presence of the judge. 
Section 78-32-3, U.C.A.; Von Hake v. Thomas, supra at 1169. See 
also, In Re Marriage of Betz, 558 N.E.2d 404, 418 (Ill.App. 
1990) where the court stated: 
Simply put, indirect contempt includes all 
contempts which do not occur in such proximity to a 
court that they fall within the direct contempt 
category. In indirect contempt cases, the judge does 
not have full personal knowledge of all elements of the 
contempt. Therefore, proof of facts of which the court 
cannot take judicial notice must be presented in order 
to support a finding of contempt. Id. at 418-19. 
In the instant case, there can be no doubt but that 
defendant was found guilty of indirect criminal and civil 
contempt. His failure to make the support payments clearly 
occurred outside of the presence of the court and required proof 
from Plaintiff in order for a contempt finding to be made. The 
thirty-day incarceration and fine was clearly criminal in nature 
for failure to pay past obligations. The additional 
incarceration until he paid the future required amounts was 
clearly civil in nature. 
Obviously, it is to a defendant's advantage to contend that 
a contempt of court is criminal because of the much higher burden 
which attaches to a criminal contempt proceeding. Conversely, it 
is to the opposing party's advantage to claim the contempt is 
civil. In the instant case, Defendant argued before the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Federal District Court that the thirty-day 
provision was criminal and therefore he had been denied all of 
his federal and state due process rights. To counter this 
argument, Plaintiff prepared the bench warrants in such a manner 
that they were ambiguous. As noted earlier, in each case the 
three bench warrants provided that Defendant would be confined 
for a period of thirty days "or until such time as he shall purge 
himself." Plaintiff argued below, therefore, that based upon the 
language of the bench warrant (not upon the underlying order) 
that this was a civil contempt order with a cap of thirty days 
and the option of early release if he were to pay the money 
sooner. See e.g., October 9, 1992 hearing, at 13-14. This 
accidental or intentional ambiguity in the bench warrants created 
the strange situation where Defendant's counsel had to ask the 
lower court to modify the bench warrant for purpose of future 
argument in the federal court even though it would mean a 
straight thirty-day incarceration for the defendant without any 
opportunity to be released sooner. (Tr. September 23, 1992, R. 
693-96). The court refused to modify the bench warrants, finding 
no ambiguity in their wording, (R. 696). 
Based upon the interpretation of the bench warrants by 
Plaintiff during the due process hearing before the Utah Supreme 
Court and the Federal District Court, Defendant could only serve 
a maximum of thirty days imprisonment and could be released 
sooner if he produced the necessary money. However, when it 
suddenly appeared that Defendant was indeed going to serve the 
entire thirty-day sentence and be released, the Plaintiff 
panicked and immediately ran to the District Court seeking help. 
Plaintiff now argued to the lower court in the ex parte hearing 
that Defendant had to serve beyond the thirty days until such 
time as he came up with the money. See "Motion for Order 
Extending Revised Warrant and Order of Commitment," and 
"Affidavit of Sharon A. Donovan" contained in unnumbered portion 
of Vol. II of District Court Record. The Court dutifully 
entered an "Ex Parte Order Extending Revised Warrant and Order of 
Commitment" on the eve that Defendant was supposed to be released 
from the Salt Lake County jail after serving the thirty-day 
sentence. 
Thus, Plaintiff had the best of both worlds. She was able 
to argue to the Utah Supreme Court and through the County 
Attorney in the Federal District Court that this was merely a 
civil order of contempt with a thirty-day cap and therefore, the 
arguments of Defendant as to criminal due process simply did not 
apply. When it appeared that Defendant would be released from 
jail after serving the thirty-day sentence, the plaintiff 
immediately ran to the District Court Judge who readily changed 
the bench warrant to require Defendant's incarceration 
indefinitely. The "thirty-day cap" under the Court's revised 
bench warrant of October 22 therefore had no meaning whatsoever 
except to illustrate that it was indeed a thirty-day criminal 
sentence. 
This Court should not condone the action of Plaintiff and 
the trial court in manipulating the underlying court order in 
such a way as to make it extremely difficult for Defendant to 
assert his constitutional rights in the appellate and federal 
judicial system. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED PROCEDURAL 
RIGHTS DURING THE PROCEEDINGS OF 
CRIMINAL CONTEMPT. 
For purposes of this section, only the thirty-day sentence 
and fine will be examined. However, as noted earlier, if 
Defendant is unable to meet the financial obligation imposed by 
the court then the entire contempt proceeding is also criminal in 
nature. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated the standard to be applied 
as to indirect criminal contempt proceedings. That Court 
stated: 
The due process provisions of the Federal 
Constitution requires that in a prosecution for a 
contempt not committed in the presence of the court, 
"the person charged be advised of the nature of the 
action against him—or her—have assistance of counsel, 
if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and 
have the right to offer testimony on his [or her] 
behalf....These protections are amplified upon in the 
Code, which requires, interalia, that in a case of 
indirect contempt, an affidavit must be presented to the 
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court reciting the facts constituting the contempt in 
order to insure that the court and the person charged 
are informed of the conduct alleged to be contemptuous. 
Von Hake, supra, at 1150 (citations omitted). 
See also, Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1991). 
Clearly, charges of indirect criminal contempt deserve the 
same constitutional protections as any other crime. Several 
courts throughout the country have enumerated these rights. In 
Vito v. Vito, 551 A.2d 573 (Pa.Super. 1988), the court noted 
that where one is accused of indirect criminal contempt he shall 
enjoy the normal rights to bail, rights to be notified of the 
accusation and time to prepare a defense, and the right to a 
speedy and public trial by impartial jury. In addition, he is 
entitled to the assistance of counsel and may only be found 
guilty if every element of the crime is proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt. "In short, the accused in such a proceeding is 
entitled to the essential procedural safeguards that attend 
criminal proceedings generally." Id. at 575-76. 
In re Marriage of Betts, 558 N.E.2d 404, 425 (111.App. 
1990). The Illinois Appellate Court observed a common problem 
which occurs in these type of divorce proceedings. As in the 
instant case, the party who is being charged with contempt is 
served notice that he is to "show cause" why he should not be 
held in contempt. By definition, however, if a defendant accused 
of criminal contempt has a constitutional right not to testify, 
he cannot be required to "show cause" since this violates his 
right to remain silent. In addition, in a criminal contempt the 
burden is on the petitioner to prove the charges in the petition 
beyond a reasonable doubt and not upon the defendant to prove his 
innocence. 558 N.E.2d at 425. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake, supra, recognized that 
in criminal contempt proceedings, it must be shown that the 
person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability 
to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so. These 
elements must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 759 P.2d at 
1172. 
A review of the record now before this Court shows without 
question that the federal and state due process rights of 
Defendant were never applied in the instant case. Petitioner was 
incarcerated for nearly thirty days because of the May 18 
proceeding. From the record now before this Court it is apparent 
that he was never advised of the criminal nature of the 
proceeding, never advised of his right to counsel or the right to 
have counsel appointed by the court if he was indigent, never 
advised of his right to remain silent, and never advised of his 
right to cross examine witnesses or to confront his accusers. 
While Defendant does not believe the January hearing is 
relevant to this issue of contempt, this same deficiency is 
equally applicable to that hearing. 
For the above reasons, therefore, Defendant was illegally 
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County jail in direct violation of 
federal and state constitutional procedural mandates. His 
conviction must be reversed. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT'S FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHTS WERE VIOLATED AS TO CIVIL CONTEMPT BY 
FAILING TO INQUIRE IF DEFENDANT WAS INDIGENT 
AND WHETHER COUNSEL NEEDED TO BE APPOINTED. 
Incarceration under civil contempt can have a far greater 
consequence than that for criminal contempt. Utah law, for 
example, places a ceiling of thirty days incarceration for 
criminal contempt, but places no such ceiling for civil contempt. 
Compare Section 78-32-10, U.C.A. with Section 78-32-12, U.C.A. 
The California Court of Appeals stated this problem as follows: 
More importantly, because the consequences of a 
"civil" contempt are potentially greater than those of a 
"criminal" one, the procedural protection in those cases 
should be the same or stronger. Child support cases 
provide a perfect example. In each type of proceeding, 
ability to pay can be an issue. But a criminal contempt 
conviction results in no more than a five-day jail 
sentence and a $1,000 fine for each contempt, while a 
civil contemner may be imprisoned indefinitely pending 
compliance. Thus, the consequences of a mistake on the 
ability to pay issue are infinitely graver in a civil 
than in a criminal contempt. Pity the poor civil 
contemner who rots in jail, having erroneously been 
determined to hold the keys to release! 
The preferable rule in contempt proceedings might 
be that the more stringent due process protections apply 
whenever the contemner is faced with the potential for 
any jail time. In Re Feiock, 263 Cal.Rptr. 437, 
440-41, n.6 (Cal.App. 1989). 
While the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have never 
addressed the issue of appointment of counsel in civil contempt 
proceedings to indigent defendants, it is submitted that both 
federal and state due process of law requires such appointment be 
made or, at the minimum, inquiry of indigency status be made. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that indigent 
defendants have a right to have counsel appointed at government 
expense when their physical liberty is in jeopardy. Lassiter v. 
Dept. of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 26-27 (1981). Numerous 
federal circuit courts have held that the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment require that an indigent defendant in a 
non-support proceeding may not be incarcerated if he has been 
denied the assistance of counsel. Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262 
(6th Cir. 1984); Walker v. McLain, 768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 
1985); Ridgeway v. Baker, 720 F.2d 1409 (5th Cir. 1983); 
and Henkel v. Bradshaw, 483 F.2d 1386 (9th Cir. 1973). 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Walker v. McLain, 
768 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1985) found that the right to counsel as 
an aspect of due process turns not on whether the proceeding may 
be characterized as criminal or civil, but on whether the 
proceedings may result in deprivation of liberty. The Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in quoting a decision from the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, stated the following: 
It is the defendant's interest in personal freedom, 
and not simply the special "Sixth and Fourteenth 
Amendment right to counsel" in criminal cases, which 
triggers the right to appointed counsel. It would be 
absurd to distinguish criminal and civil incarceration; 
from the prospective of the person incarcerated, the 
jail is just as bleak no matter which label is used. In 
addition, the line between criminal and civil contempt 
is a fine one, and is rarely as clear as the state would 
have us believe. The right to counsel, as an aspect of 
due process, turns not on whether a proceeding may be 
characterized as "criminal" or "civil" but on whether 
the proceeding may result in a deprivation of liberty. 
Id. at 1183. 
The Tenth Circuit of Appeals knows the need for counsel is 
even greater in civil contempt cases. The Court stated: 
If petitioner is truly indigent, his liberty 
interest is no more conditional than if he were serving 
a criminal sentence; he does not have the keys to the 
prison doors if he cannot afford the price. The fact 
that he should not have been jailed if he is truly 
indigent only highlights the need for counsel, for the 
assistance of a lawyer would have greatly aided him in 
establishing his indigency and insuring that he was not 
improperly incarcerated. The argument that the 
petitioner has the keys to the jailhouse door does not 
apply to diminish petitioner's liberty interest. Id. at 
1184. 
In addition, a number of federal district courts have 
reached a similar result. McKenstry v. Genesee Co., 669 F.Supp. 
801 (D.Mich. 1987); Johnson v. Zurz, 596 F.Supp. 39 (D.Ohio 
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1984); Lake v. Speziale, 580 F.Supp. 1318 (D.Conn. 1984); Young 
v, Whitworth, 522 F.Supp. 759 (D.Ohio 1981); Maston v. 
Fellerhoff, 526 F.Supp. 969 (D.Ohio 1981). 
Likewise, a large majority of the state courts have held 
that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel in a civil 
contempt proceeding before he can be incarcerated. State v. 
Gruchalla, 467 N.W.2d 451 (N.D. 1991); Mead v. Batchelor, 460 
N.W.2d 493 (Mich. 1990); New York v. Lobenthal, 516 N.Y.S.2d 928 
<N.Y. 1987); In Re: Marriage of Stariha, 509 N.E.2d 1117 
(Ind.App. 1987); Hunt v. Moreland, 697 S.W.2d 326 (Mo.App. 
1985); Rutherford v. Rutherford, 464 A.2d 228 (Md. 1983); Dube 
v. Lopes, 481 A.2d 1293 (Conn. 1984); and Padilla v. Padilla, 
645 P.2d 1327 (Colo.App. 1982). 
During both the January and May proceedings Defendant 
represented himself. Defendant's wife testified in the January 
proceeding that they were unable to afford an attorney. In an 
affidavit filed with this Court in support of a stay, Defendant 
stated he was financially unable to afford counsel to represent 
him. Defendant's income tax returns for 1989, 1990 and 1991 
fully support his position of income. Plaintiff has not shown in 
any of these proceedings below sources of income or assets which 
have been hidden or which are available to Defendant upon 
command. Instead, Plaintiff has relied upon the wealth of 
Defendant's father as the source of income from which these 
delinquent amounts can be paid. Such reliance is clearly 
inappropriate, improper, and illegal since Defendant's father is 
under no legal obligation to support his son or his son's 
ex-spouse and children. 
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It is submitted that under the standards enunciated by these 
numerous courts throughout the country, Defendant was and is 
entitled to appointed counsel in these civil contempt proceedings 
in which he faces unlimited jail incarceration for failure to 
make support payments. The failure to make any inquiry as to his 
financial status not only goes to the issue of the substantive 
evidence required for contempt but also goes to the question of 
appointment of counsel. As such, the failure to make this 
inquiry voids any finding of civil contempt. 
POINT IV 
THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
ESTABLISH THE ELEMENTS REQUIRED FOR 
CIVIL OR CRIMINAL CONTEMPT AND, IN 
ADDITION, THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER 
COURT ARE LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT TO 
IMPOSE CONTEMPT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Von Hake, supra, found that the 
trial court must enter written findings of fact and conclusions 
of law with respect to each of the three substantive elements of 
contempt. 759 P.2d at 1172. These include a showing that the 
defendant knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and 
intentionally failed or refused to do so. These elements must be 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal contempt 
proceeding and by clear and convincing evidence in a civil 
contempt proceeding. Id. 
This Court in State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467 (Utah App. 
1991) held that written findings of fact and conclusions of law 
are not required because of an amendment to the civil code 
provided that these findings are contained'somewhere in the 
written record. Even if this interpretation of the Von Hake 
decision is correct, the record clearly shows that no such 
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findings exist in any form. 
The present contempt of court action in which defendant was 
incarcerated for nearly thirty days was based upon the May 
hearing in which no separate findings of fact or conclusions of 
law were made. While the order of June 19, 1992 recites that the 
Court "made and entered adequate and sufficient findings of fact" 
no such findings or conclusions exist. Moreover, there is no 
evidence in the May hearing justifying the conclusion of criminal 
or civil contempt. No evidence was formally taken at all! The 
only statements made by Plaintiff's attorney relating to 
Defendant's ability to pay concern the sale of his father's farm 
and the inadequacy of Defendant's income. Neither of these 
unsupported assertions are sufficient to incarcerate a defendant 
father. 
There is a major distinction between an original divorce 
action and a supplemental action for contempt. As in this case, 
the lower court concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that 
Defendant was capable of making the support payments in spite of 
his claims to the contrary. This Court affirmed that decision 
based upon the lower court's discretion. The result of these 
decisions was to impose a continuing financial obligation upon 
the defendant to meet the amounts awarded to the plaintiff. 
Failure to comply with the court's order results in a monetary 
judgment being levied against the defendant and subjects his 
income and property to continued attachment by plaintiff as a 
creditor. 
On the other hand, this same standard of evidence is not 
appropriate in contempt proceedings. In order for civil contempt 
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to apply there must be a showing of clear and convincing evidence 
of the present ability of the defendant to meet the obligations 
ordered by the court. In criminal proceedings this proof rises 
to the highest level of beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, under 
either of these standards mere speculation as to what the 
defendant should be making as a veterinarian or inferences that 
his family should be able to assist him in his support obligation 
are simply insufficient as a matter of law. 
The evidentiary hearing held in January is equally defective 
should it be relevant to this case. Defendant would assert, 
however, that as a matter of law this hearing is not relevant 
ince Defendant's incarceration did not directly eminate from that 
hearing. Moreover, as a matter of principle a hearing which is 
held five months prior to another hearing in which contempt is 
ordered is simply insufficient to meet the high standards of 
proof since the financial ability of a defendant can change from 
month to month and it is simply against due process of law to 
allow previous hearings as the evidentiary basis for subsequent 
contempts. 
In any event, there is nothing contained in the January 
findings to indicate the willful failure to have paid past 
obligations or the present ability of the defendant to pay these 
large arrearages and ongoing obligations. No finding whatsoever 
is made of his income, with the exception of paragraph 5(f) which 
states: "Defendant is a veterinarian practicing in excess of 15 
years and testified he earns $5 per hour in connection with 
consultations he claims he provided to the Osguthorpe Animal 
Hospital. Defendant had and has the means to pay child support." 
This conclusionary statement is inadequate as a basis to 
show Defendant's ability to pay these amounts by clear and 
convincing evidence or to show that he willfully failed to pay 
his past obligations beyond a reasonable doubt. No contrary 
evidence was offered by Plaintiff as to what the defendant should 
have been making as a veterinarian or that he was guilty of 
federal fraud for falsely reporting his income on the federal tax 
forms. There is not a single reference contained in the findings 
of January to show that Defendant has the past or present ability 
to pay the amounts now imposed by the lower court. 
The Utah Supreme Court has required that civil contempt 
cannot be imposed without an affirmative finding by the lower 
court of a present ability to comply. Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 
627 P.2d 528, 531 (Utah 1981). Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court 
in Coleman v. Coleman, 664 P.2d 1155 (Utah 1983) held that a 
lower court must make explicit findings as to a defendant's 
ability to comply when there is conflicting evidence. Failure to 
provide sufficient findings of the ability to comply with a 
contempt order requires automatic reversal. Von Hake, 
supra, 1159 P.2d at 1173. See also, Matter of Elder, 
763 P.2d 219 (Ala. 1988). 
In summary, the fact that this Court affirmed the award of 
child support and alimony in the previous appeal is completely 
irrelevant to the issues now before this Court as to the 
contempt. An examinaton of the transcripts of the May and 
January hearings show that there is clearly insufficient evidence 
to justify a finding of criminal contempt or civil contempt. 
Moreover, the lower court has completely failed in its obligation 
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to make explicit findings needed in order to affirm these types 
of contempt proceedings. It is submitted that lower courts 
routinely abuse the penalty of contempt and subject litigants to 
illegal hardship caused by the courts1 failures to understand and 
to follow the concepts of criminal and civil contempt. 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT'S INCARCERATION FOR THIRTY 
DAYS IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL 
VIOLATED ARTICLE I SECTION 16 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION WHICH PROVIDES THAT 
THERE SHALL BE NO IMPRISONMENT FOR DEBT. 
Each day hundreds of judgments are entered in the State of 
Utah. In each case one party is indebted to another. It is rare 
indeed, however, that such indebtedness results in jail 
incarceration. Defendant, in fact, knows of no classification of 
cases except for domestic relation controversies in which 
indebtedness can result in jail sentences. 
Obviously, the reason that child support and other marital 
obligations can result in imprisonment whereas other forms of 
debts do not, is the value society places upon the support of its 
children. If a father willfully refuses to meet his support 
obligation then society allows the father's imprisonment until he 
meets his moral and legal obligation. On the other hand, if a 
father is simply unable to meet his financial obligation through 
no willful disobedience then imprisonment is no more justified 
than in any other case involving debt. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Thomas v. Thomas, 569 P.2d 
1119 (Utah 1977) discussed Article I Section 16 of the Utah 
Constitution. The Court stated: 
Under what we regard as a view more enlightened 
than prevailed in former times, the mere failure to pay 
a debt or meet an obligation is not punishable by 
imprisonment. (Citing Article I Section 16, Utah 
Constitution). However, when a proper order or judgment 
has been made, one who stands in willful defiance or 
disobedience thereof may be found in contempt of court 
and punished by imprisonment....Although technically 
civil in nature, the finding of a person in contempt and 
sentencing him to jail is a very serious consequence to 
the person involved, somewhat akin to a criminal 
penalty. It is for this reason that such a severe 
measure is not permissible unless a party has manifested 
such obstinacy in disobedience of the court order that 
it is necessary to accomplish that which equity and 
justice demand. Accordingly, in order to justify a 
finding of contempt and the imposition of a jail 
sentence, it must appear by clear and convincing proof 
that (1) the party knew what was required of him; (2) 
that he had the ability to comply; and (3) that he 
willfully and knowingly failed and refused to do so. 
Id. at 1121. (Emphasis added). 
This Court can search the record in vain for any evidence to 
show that defendant Jerry Osguthorpe willfully refused to meet 
the obligations imposed by the court during the divorce 
proceeding. Plaintiff has been unable to point to any source of 
income that Defendant is shielding or hiding. There is no asset 
which Defendant could utilize in satisfying the court obligation. 
In fact, the income that Defendant now has is nearly identical to 
that which he had during the marriage to Plaintiff. An 
examination of all of the income tax forms from 1981 to 1991 
reveal almost a consistent pattern of income. 
Plaintiff has convinced Judge Wilkinson to the contrary by 
relying upon three arguments: (1) Defendant should be making more 
as a veterinarian; (2) Defendant lives very nicely with his 
present wife and therefore must have money; (3) Defendant's 
family and father are very wealthy and therefore he must have 
money too. 
These emotional arguments of Plaintiff in her claim of a 
"deadbeat dad" are not legally or factually supportable. 
Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence in the record to 
show what the defendant should be making as a veterinarian. Not 
one item of evidence exists as to the normal income of a contract 
veterinarian such as defendant. Essentially, the lower court is 
taking judicial notice of what he believes the defendant should 
be making and holding him to that standard. 
The income or assets of Defendant's wife is equally 
irrelevant. The fact that Defendant has married a woman who was 
given a house and other assets from her ex-husband is irrelevant 
to the obligation of Defendant. She is not required to utilize 
her assets in paying his pre-marital debts. Furthermore, the 
fact that Defendant contributes $500 to the household expenses 
each month is not justification for imprisonment. Had he not 
married his current wife it is unlikely that even Judge Wilkinson 
would have denied him the use of $500 for his own living 
expenses. 
Finally, the fact that his father and family are purportedly 
wealthy is also irrelevant to placing Defendant in jail. 
Defendant's family is not legally obligated to support 
Defendant's children. The dialogue which occurred between 
Plaintiff's counsel and Defendant's father is indicative of 
Plaintiffs feeling that D.A. Osguthorpe is obligated to pay his 
son's financial obligations. 
The cold hard record in this case shows without question 
that defendant Jerry Osguthorpe is financially incapable of 
meeting the demands of the court and will consistently be 
indebted to the plaintiff as long as support must continue. 
However, such indebtedness does not show contempt and does not 
justify imprisonment. Innuendoes and implications cannot be used 
as the clear and convincing evidence or the evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt that must be present before incarceration can 
occur. 
The past incarceration in the Salt Lake County jail and the 
future threat of incarceration are not permissible under the Utah 
Constitution based upon the record as it now exists. Defendant's 
imprisonment was clearly unconstitutional and any future attempt 
for imprisonment without a strong showing of additional evidence 
by plaintiff cannot be tolerated. 
POINT VI 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING 
PLAINTIFF ATTORNEYS' FEES INCURRED AS 
A RESULT OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT ACTION AND THE 
FEDERAL COURT HABEAS CORPUS ACTION. 
There is no question but that Section 30-3-3 U.C.A. provides 
that either party to a divorce action may be ordered to pay the 
adverse party to prosecute or defend the action. Maughn v. 
Maughn, 770 P.2d 156 (Utah App. 1989). In addition, there is no 
question but that this Court in its discretion may award 
attorney's fees on appeal especially if they were awarded by the 
lower court in the divorce action. Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 
408 (Utah App. 1989). 
The decision to award attorneys' fees on appeal, however, 
rests with the appellate court. In this very action, for 
example, this Court originally awarded only attorneys' fees as to 
the divorce proceeding in the lower court. Plaintiff petitioned 
for rehearing and this Court subsequently issued a separate 
opinion in which attorneys' fees on appeal were ordered. 
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Obviously, Plaintiff was aware that in the absence of such an 
award by this Court she could not seek attorneys1 fees on appeal 
from Judge Wilkinson. She correctly petitioned this Court for an 
order remanding to the lower court for a determination of fees. 
Likewise, in the motion to stay the contempt proceeding 
Plaintiff sought attorneys' fees for her effort. This court in 
denying the stay granted attorneys' fees on appeal and once again 
remanded for a determination of the amount. Thus, the instant 
case itself is a prime example of the principle that a superior 
court must itself award attorneys' fees in an appeal before an 
inferior court can determine their amount. 
Section 30-3-3 is unique. In most instances involving 
litigation, attorney fees are not awarded to the opposing party. 
As such, this section must be strictly construed. The section 
states that the court may order either party to pay to the clerk 
a sum of money "to enable such party to prosecute or defend the 
action." The term "the action" must refer to a divorce proceeding 
since it is contained in Chapter 3 of the Utah Code exclusively 
dealing with divorce. 
Defendant sought a writ of mandamus and/or common law writ 
of certiorari from the Utah Supreme Court to require this Court 
or Judge Wilkinson to grant a stay of imprisonment until this 
matter had been decided on appeal. Thus, the action before the 
Supreme Court was not one of divorce but was one seeking to stay 
Defendant's imprisonment on the theory of judicial abuse of 
discretion. As such, therefore, Section 30-3-3 cannot be used to 
grant authority for attorneys' fees to plaintiff before the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
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The action in the Federal District Court is even more 
apparent. There, Defendant brought an action against the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff seeking relief based on the writ of habeas 
corpus. Plaintiff was not even a named party in that lawsuit. 
Certainly Section 30-3-3 cannot be utilized to pay the costs of a 
non-party in a federal habeas corpus action. 
Moreover, in the Supreme Court action Plaintiff specifically 
asked the court to grant attorneys* fees to her in her effort to 
incarcerate her former husband. The court made no such award. 
Had it wished to award attorney fees it could have honored her 
request since Plaintiff's attorney specifically proffered an 
amount of fees and costs during oral argument. 
Neither this Court nor the trial court has authority even in 
a divorce action to award attorney fees incurred in a higher 
court without that court's discretionary approval. Judge 
Wilkinson was in error in believing that he could make such an 
award in the complete absence of authority by the Supreme Court 
ordering such an award be made. 
For these reasons, therefore, the lower court's award of 
attorneys' fees to Plaintiff as to the Supreme Court action and 
the Federal habeas corpus action must be vacated and these 
amounts must be subtracted from the judgment entered against 
Defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, the judgment of contempt and 
for attorney fees must be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this 30th day of November, 1992. 
^ 
<w^\^0, 
Craig S. /Cook 
Attorney for Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing Brief of Appellant to Sharon A. Donovan, 
Attorney for Appellee, 310 South Main, #1330, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84111 this 30th day of November, 1992. 
JlvAAJs/ SiAfffi^ 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oOo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant, 
ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENT, ATTORNEY'S FEES 
AND OTHER RELATED MATTERS 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
-oOo-
Plaintifffs Verified Motion for Judgment, Attorney's Fees and 
Other -Related Matters came on regularly for hearing on October 9, 
1992, before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, one of the Judges of 
the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff appearing in person and by and 
through her attorney, Sharon A- Donovan, and Defendant appearing in 
person and being represented by his attorney, Craig S. Cook, and 
Plaintiff having been called as a witness on her Motion, and the 
Court having heard the testimony and reviewed the pleadings and 
argument of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. Judgment shall enter against Defendant in the sum of 
$1,625.00, which represents $1,100,00 unpaid child support through 
the first half of October, 1992, and $525.00 alimony through the 
first half of October, 1992. 
2. The Court finds that Defendant has filed an appeal in the 
Utah Court of Appeals from the District Court's finding of 
contempt, has filed a Petition for Extraordinary Relief in the Utah 
Supreme Court and further filed a Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus 
against the Sherifffs Department, necessitating action and 
attorney's fees on behalf of the Plaintiff. 
The Court finds that pursuant to Utah Code Ann. , §30-3-3, this 
Court has the authority in divorce actions to grant fees as may be 
appropriate in this matter. Based thereon, the Court orders a 
judgment of $5,214.25 against Defendant for attorney's fees 
Plaintiff has reasonably incurred in defending the matters filed by 
Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Supreme Court and Federal Court. 
The Court further finds that the Court of Appeals specifically 
remanded to the trial Court the award of Appellee's costs and 
attorney's fees reasonably incurred in opposing the stay. The 
Court further finds that the judgment for attorney's fees in the 
Supreme Court of $3,196.60 and the Federal Court of $620.70 shall 
be awarded by way of judgment, unless the Federal Court or Supreme 
Court specifically indicate that it was their intention not to 
award attorney's fees to Plaintiff in this matter. The relief 
requested by Defendant in the Court of Appeals, Federal Court and 
Supreme Court have all been denied by those Courts. The Court 
2 
further finds that Defendant shall receive credit for time served 
from the previous jail sentence in this matter. 
The Court further finds that Plaintiff does not have the 
ability to pay these fees and that these fees are reasonable, in 
light of the actions of Defendant, and that Defendant has the 
ability to pay said fees. The Court further finds that these fees 
are segregated as follows: 
Court of Appeals $1,396.95 
Supreme Court 3,196.60 
Federal Court 620.70 
Total: $5,214.25 
The Court further finds that judgment shall enter against 
Defendant in the sum of $300.00 for additional fees, for purposes 
of this hearing, for a total judgment for this hearing of 
$7,139.25. 
DATED this day of November, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
CRAIG S. COOK 
Attorney for Defendant 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
MARTIN VERHOEF #3326 
Deputy Salt lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
2001 South State Street, IS3600 
Salt lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
(801) 468-2656 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OP UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe, 
Petitioner 
-v-
Aaron D. Kennard# Sheriff 
of Salt lake County, 
Respondent 
* 
Order of Dismissal 
Case No. 92C-0748A 
The referrenced matter came on for hearing on Friday, October 
2, 1992, the Honorable Bruce S. Jenkins presiding, Craig Cook 
appearing for Petitioner and Marty Verhoef appearing for 
Respondent; 
The Court having reviewed the pleadings on file and having 
heard arguments of counsel concerning Petitioner's opportunity and 
ability to be heard on the merits in the Courts of the State of 
Utah, including appellate review on the merits, Petitioner's 
present opportunity for further review within the State Courts upon 
allegations of changed circumstances which would justify 
modifications of current support orders, and the Federal Court's 
extreme deference to the factual findings of the Courts of the 
f 
w 
State of Utah and the right of a State Trial Court to vindicate its 
own orders; and 
It appearing to the Court Petitioner has failed to demonstrate 
that Petitioner's custody was in violation of the Constitution, 
laws or treaties of the United States; 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED the entitled matter be 
and hereby is dismissed. 
Dated this lis . day of D ^ ^ V J L M ^ V 1992. 
By the Court: 
Bruce 5. Jen 
District 
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DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
MARTIN VERHOEF #3326 
Deputy Salt Lake County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
(801) 468-2656 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH 
CENTRAL DIVISION 
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe, * RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Petitioner * 
-v- * Case No. 92C-0748A 
Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff * 
of Salt Lake County, 
Respondent 
Respondent, through counsel of record hereby answers the 
allegations of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Petitioner was released from incarceration on August 31, 1992 
upon payment of $2,000 pursuant to Court order filed with 
Respondent. A copy of said order, a receipt for the funds, booking 
record and jail internal log sheet are attached hereto as exhibits. 
Petitioner's lack of custody deprives the Court of jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. §2254 requiring dismissal. 
SECOND DEFENSE 
Petitioner is not in custody and therefore is seeking relief 
against a future judgment. Petitioner has not rcjquested such 
t 
RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Case No. 92C-0748A 
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relief nor named the Attorney General of the State of Utah as 
respondent. The Sheriff of Salt Lake County is not a proper party 
to such an action. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Petitioner's incarceration was for civil contempt as reflected 
by the Court order attached hereto as an exhibit. Said order 
committed Petitioner into the custody of the Salt Lake County 
Sheriff "for a period of thirty (30) days, or until such time as he 
shall purge himself..." of contempt by paying past due alimony, 
child support and attorney's fees totalling $2,000 to plaintiff, 
Jeanette C. Osguthorpe. Civil contempt custody is not a proper 
ground upon which relief may be granted. 
FOURTH DEFENSE 
Responding to the allegations of the petition, Respondent 
answers as follows: 
1• Admitted• 
2. Denied. The judgment received by Respondent from the 
trial court was dated June 5, 1992. A copy thereof is attached. 
3. Denied. The judgment was for thirty (30) days or until 
Petitioner purged himself by paying $2,000 to plaintiff for past 
due child support, alimony and attorney's fees or unless otherwise 
discharged. 
4. Admitted. 
5-7. Denied. The Court found in prior evidentiary hearings 
Petitioner had the ability to pay. 
-7 
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8-11. Admitted. 
12A-D. Denied. Civil contempt proceedings of the trial court 
are presumptively valid, were imposed for only thirty (30) days and 
were purged by Petitioner upon payment of $2,000. The substance of 
Petitioners allegations are clearly refuted by the Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities filed in the Utah Supreme Court in 
opposition to Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Writ, a copy 
of which is attached hereto. The Utah Supreme Court denied the 
writ. 
RULE 5 STATEMENTS 
Pursuant to Rule 5, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the 
United States District Court, Respondent states as follows: 
1. Petitioner requested a stay of the contempt order pending 
appeal and exhausted that remedy through the Utah Supreme Court. 
Said request appears to have raised the issues which could have 
been raised in a petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
2. Petitioner has filed a Notice of Appeal in Salt Lake 
County District Court, however no further steps hctve been taken in 
furtherance of said appeal, no briefs have been filed and no 
transcripts have been ordered. 
3. All proceedings before the Trial Court have been 
reported; however, Respondent has determined Petitioner has failed 
to make financial arrangements with the Court reporter for payment. 
Only two partial transcripts are available for January 7, 1992 and 
May 18, 1992. No evidentiary hearings have been transcribed. 
a 
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4. Certain transcripts of proceedings have been supplied by 
counsel for Plaintiff and are attached hereto. Copies of pleadings 
filed in the Utah Court of Appeals and Utah Supreme court are also 
attached. 
WHEREFORE, having fully answered the Petition, Respondent 
requests the same be dismissed or Respondent be dismissed from the 
action or such other relief as the Court deems appropriate. 
DATED this 25th day of September, 1992 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake County Attorney 
Martin Verhoef, #332S/ 
Deputy Salt Lake Cbunty Attorney 
2001 South State Street, #S3600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84190-1200 
n 
AO 241 (Rev. 5/85) PETITION UNDER 28 USC § 2254 FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS BY A PERSON IN STATE CUSTODY 
IBmtefc g>tate0 iiatrict ( tart 
SJame 
J e r r y S i l v e r Os^u tho rpe . __ ._ 
District 
Prisoner No. Case No. 
Place of Confinement 
S a l t Lake County J a i l 
Name of Petitioner (include name under which convicted) 
J e r r y S i l v e r O s g u t h o r p e 
Name of Respondent (authorized person having custody of petitioner) 
V. Aaron D. Kennard, Sheriff, Salt Lake Co. 
The Attorney General of the State of: 
PETITION 
1. Name and location of court which entered the judgment of conviction under attack T h i r d J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah; Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson 
2. Date of judgment of conviction J u n e 1 9 1 1992 
3. Length of sentence 30 days "and such l o n g e r t i m e a s t h e c o u r t deems f i t t o impose^ 
s e n t e n d e " u n t i l P e t i t i o n e r p a y s t h e d e l i n q u e n t c h i l d s u p p o r t and a l i m o n y . 
4. Nature of offense involved (all counts) F a i l u r e t o pay c u r r e n t and d e l i n q u e n t c h i l d s u p p o r t 
and a l i m o n y • 
5. What was your plea? (Check one) 
(a) Not guilty • 
(b) Guilty • 
(c) Nolo contendere • 
Since this matter was never treated as a criminal 
proceeding no official plea was ever taken. Petitioner 
maintained, however, that he had the inability to pay 
the amount required by the court. 
It you entered a guilty plea to one count or indictment, and a not guilty plea to another count or indictment, give details: 
6. If you pleaded not guilty, what kind of trial did you have? (Check one) 
(a) Jury • The May 18, 1992 hearing was not an evidentiary trial, 
(b) Judge only D Judge Wilkinson ruled on an Order to Show Cause. 
7. Did you testify at the trial? 
Yes D No D 
Petitioner, unrepresented by counsel, made statements 
to the court but did not do so under oath. 
8. Did you appeal from the judgment of conviction? 
Yes S No D 
fO\ 
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9. If you did appeal, answer the following: 
(a) Name of court Utah Court of Appeals _ _ 
(b) R^nit Court of appeals refused to issue stay pending appeal and remanded to 
trial court for award of attorneys' fees, 
(c) Date of result and citation, if known July 16, 1992 _ 
(d) Grounds raised Improper procedure; failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing as to 
ability to pay; failure to enter legally sufficient findings and conclusions of 
law; stay should be granted because of irreparable harm if sentence is allowed 
t 0 proceed. ^ = 
(e) It you sought turther review ot the decision on appeal by a higher state court, please answer the following: 
(1) Name of court 
(2) Result 
(3) Date of result and citation, if known 
(4) Grounds raised 
(t) If you filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, please answer the following with respect to 
each direct appeal: 
(1) Name of court 
(2) Result : 
(3) Date of result and citation, if known 
(4) Grounds raised 
10. Other than a direct appeal from the judgment of conviction and sentence, have you previously filed any petitions, 
applications, or motions with respect to this judgment in any court, state or federal? 
Yes _ N o D 
11. If your answer to 10 was "yes," give the following information: 
(a) (1) Name of court Utah Supreme Cour t 
(2) Nature of proceeding E x t r a o r d i n a r y w r i t r e q u e s t e d i n t h e n a t u r e of mandamus, 
supersedeas and certiorari. 
Improper procedure; failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing 
(3) Grounds raised a s t o a b i l i t y t o p a y : f a i l u r e t o e n t e r l e g a l l y s u f f i c i e n t 
findings and conclusions of law; stay should be granted because of 
irreparable harm if sentence was allowed to proceed. 
AO 241 (Rev. 5/85) 
(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? 
Yes D No H 
The Utah Supreme Court: d e c l i n e d t o g r a n t any r e l i e f s t a y i n g t h e 
(5) Result p.xp.fMif.ion of t h e s e n t e n c e , 
(6) Date of result August 1 7 , 1992 
(b) As to any second petition, application or motion give the same information: 
(1) Name of court 
(2) Nature of proceeding 
(3) Grounds raised 
(4) Did you receive an evidentiary hearing on your petition, application or motion? 
Yes D No D 
(5) Result 
(6) Date of result 
(c) Did you appeal to the highest state court having jurisdiction the result of action taken on any petition, application or 
motion? 
(1) First petition, etc. Yes • No E 
(2) Second petition, etc. Yes • No S 
(d) If you did not appeal from the adverse action on any petition, application or motion, explain briefly why you did not: 
Since the petition was brought in the Utah Supreme Court there was no other 
avenue of appeal, . 
12. State concisely every ground on which you claim that you are being held unlawfully. Summarize briefly thefacts supporting 
each ground. If necessary, you may attach pages stating additional grounds and facts supporting same. 
CAUTION: In order to proceed in the federal court, you must ordinarily first exhaust your available state court remedies 
as toeach ground on which you request action by the federal court. If you fail to set forth all grounds in this petition, you may 
bejbarred from presenting additional grounds at_ajater_date. 
AO 241 (Rev. 5/85) 
For your information, the following is a list of the most frequently raised grounds for relief in habeas corpus proceedings. 
Each statement preceded by a letter constitutes a separate ground for possible relief. You may raise any grounds which you 
may have other than those listed if you have exhausted your state court remedies with respect to them. However, you should 
raise in this petition all available grounds (relating to this conviction) on which you base your allegations that you are being 
held in custody unlawfully. 
Do not check any of these listed grounds. If you select one or more of these grounds for relief, you must allege facts. The 
petition will be returned to you if you merely check (a) through (j) or any one of these grounds. 
(a) Conviction obtained by plea of guilty which was unlawfully induced or not made voluntarily with understanding of the 
nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. 
(b) Conviction obtained by use of coerced confession. 
(c) Conviction obtained by use of evidence gained pursuant to an unconstitutional search and seizure. 
(d) Conviction obtained by use of evidence obtained pursuant to an unlawful arrest. 
(e) Conviction obtained by a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 
(f) Conviction obtained by the unconstitutional failure of the prosecution to disclose to the defendant evidence favorable to 
the defendant. 
(g) Conviction obtained by a violation of the protection against double jeopardy. 
(h) Conviction obtained by action of a grand or petit jury which was unconstitutionally selected and impaneled, 
(i) Denial of effective assistance of counsel, 
(j) Denial of right of appeal. 
A. Ground one: Petitioner was denied federal due process of law in that his conviction 
for criminal contempt did not involve any criminal procedural protections. 
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law) Petitioner was found guilty of criminal 
contempt in May of 1992. He was never advised that this was a criminal 
proceeding, was not advised as to the right of counsel or to appointment of 
counsel, was not advised as to the right to remain silent or the right to call 
or confront witnesses. In short* this matter was treated as purely civil in 
nature even though a criminal sentence was imposed. 
Ground two* Petitioner was denied substantive due process rights in that there 
was no evidence taken to establish that Petitioner has the ability to comply 
with the Court's order but willfully refused to do so. 
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law): The May 1992 hearing was not an 
evidentiary trial. Instead, it was in the nature of an Order to Show Cause at 
which time Petitioner, representing himself, merely made statements to the Court 
as to his inability to pay. No witnesses were called and neither party was 
placed under oath. The failure to conduct an evidentiary hearing of any type 
violates procedural due process. The failure to produce any substantial 
evidence of ability to pay violates substantive due process. 
AO 241 (Rev. 5/85) 
C. Ground three: Petitioner's right to due process was also violated by failure to 
inquire as to his financial status for appointment of counsel as to a civil 
contempt proceeding. 
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law): During the May hearing, no effort was 
made to inquire as to whether Petitioner wished counsel appointed to represent 
him for civil contempt which could result in an unlimited sentence of 
incarceration. 
D. Ground four The failure of the State courts to grant a stay of the jail sentence 
pending appeal renders any such appeal ineffective to protect the constitutional 
rights of Petitioner. 
Supporting FACTS (state briefly without citing cases or law): Petitioner's present incarceration f 01 
criminal and civil contempt will continue for thirty days plus any additional 
time the state court judge wishes to impose upon Petitioner. Under the 
procedures of appeal in Utah, Petitioner will serve all of his jail time months, 
if not years, before a decision of its imposition will be made. 
13. If any of the grounds listed in 12A, B, C, and D were not previously presented in any other court, state or federal, state briefly 
what grounds were not so presented, and give your reasons for not presenting them: The argument in D 
has never been presented to a state court since it is a particularized claim 
for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction. Petitioner has no other state remedy 
available to stay the imposition of the sentence pending appeal. 
14. Do you have any petition or appeal now pending in any court, either state or federal, as to the judgment under attack? 
Yes S No D 
15. Give the name and address, if known, of each attorney who represented you in the following stages of the judgment attacked 
herein: 
^XSS^PSXgSS^^aSig Craig S. Cook. 3645 East 3100 South, represented Petitioner 
after the contempt proceeding had occurred. He has represented Petitioner in the 
Utah Court of Appeals and in the Utah Supreme Court. 
(b) At arraignment and plea 
A0 241 (Rev. 5/85) 
(c) At trial 
(d) At sentencing 
(e) On appeal 
(f) In any post-conviction proceeding 
(g) On appeal from any adverse ruling in a post-conviction proceeding 
16. Were you sentenced on more than one count of an indictment, or on more than one indictment, in the same court and at the 
same time? 
Yes D No D N/A 
17. Do you have any future sentence to serve after you complete the sentence imposed by the judgment under attack? 
Yes D No D N/A 
(a) If so, give name and location of court which imposed sentence to be served in the future: 
(b) Give date and length of the above sentence: 
(c) Have you filed, or do you contemplate filing, any petition attacking the judgment which imposed the sentence to be 
served in the future? 
Yes D No D 
Wherefore, petitioner prays that the Court grant petitioner relief to whichlhe may be entitled in thk proceeding. 
Signature of Attorney (if any) 
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on 
(date) 
Signature of Petitioner 
a\ »#» 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
332 STATE CAPITOL 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
AUGUST 17, 1992 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
Sharon A. Donovan 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys at Law 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe, 
Pet.i tioner, 
v. No. 920368 
Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe, 
The Honorable Homer F. 
Wilkinson, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court, State 
of Utah; Judges Judith 
Billings, Russell W. Bench, 
Norman H. Jackson, Judges of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Respondents. 
In the absence of an adequate foundation the petition for 
extraordinary writ is denied. In addition the motion for a stay 
of execution is also denied. 
Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk 
EXHIBIT "B" 
HfcCEIVED 
AUG 2 0 1992 
''jan. Adamson & Dor .ova i 
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SHARON A. DONOVAN (0901) 
SHANNON W. CLARK (5678) 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Respondent, Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: (801) 521-6383 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
oOo 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
THE HONORABLE HOMER F. 
WILKINSON, Judge of the Third 
Judicial District Court, State 
of Utah; JUDGES JUDITH 
BILLINGS, RUSSELL W. BENCH, 
NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Respondents. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES 
Case No- 920368 
-oOo-
COMES NOW the Respondent, Jeanette Osguthorpe, and hereby 
submits this Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
the Petitioner's Petition for Extraordinary Writ, This Memorandum 
is supplemental to Respondent's Response to Motion to Stay Bench 
Warrant and/or Issue Writ of Supersedeas Pending Review by Law and 
Motion Panel filed in this Court on August 10, 1992 (hereinafter 
referred to as "Respondent's Response"). That Response sets forth 
in detail the statement of facts relied on in this Memorandum. 
The trial court also provided adequate findings as 
reflected in the bench ruling and the Orders to show, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the elements of contempt were met, namely "that 
the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the 
ability to comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so." 
Von Hake, 759 P.2d at 1172. 
The Court of Appeals did not abuse it discretion in 
finding that Petitioner's appeal is not likely to prevail on its 
merits. Respondent respectfully requests that the Petition for 
Extraordinary Relief be denied, that no stay of the jail sentence 
be granted and that Respondent be awarded her attorney's fees and 
Court costs herein. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13 — day of August, 1992. 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
By. OV^KAA^\ 6^. 
SHARON A. DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
» 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
FILED 
rJUCl61992f 
Jeanette Crawford Osguthorpe, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
T
. *oonan 
sr* c: ihs Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
ORDER DENYING STAY 
Case No. 920395-CA 
Before Judges Billings, Bench, and Jackson (Law and Motion). 
This case is before the court on appellant's motion for stay 
pending appeal. Based upon the memoranda filed by the parties 
and oral argument before the court, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion for stay pending appeal 
is denied, and the temporary stay previously granted is vacated, 
based upon the court's determination that appellant has not 
sufficiently demonstrated that he would be likely to succeed on 
the merits of the appeal. See Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 
10'26, 1027 (Utah App. 1987) (per curiam), and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the case is temporarily remanded 
to the trial court for determination and entry of an award of 
appellee's costs and attorneys' fees reasonably incurred in 
opposing the motion for stay. 
/ / # 
Dated this /£ day of July, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
U2L 
dith M. Billings, ge 
r 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
JUN24392 
'TNoonan 
Lof the Court 
Utsh Court of Appeals. 
Jeanetter Crawford Osguthorpe, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Jerry Silver Osguthorpe, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
ORDER 
Case No. 920395-CA 
This case is before the court on appellant's motion for a 
staying the imposition of a jail sentence upon defendant for 
contempt of court pending a determination on appeal or, in the 
alternative, until a full hearing can be held on the motion for 
stay. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that a temporary stay of the imposition 
of the jail sentence is granted, which shall continue until a 
further order of this court, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a hearing on the merits of the 
motion for stay is scheduled before the law and motion panel of 
this court on July 15, 1992 at 9:00 a.m. at 230 South 500 East, 
#400, Salt Lake City Utah, and 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this temporary stay shall have no 
effect on the ongoing obligations of defendant/appellant to make 
any child support, alimony, or other payments under the orders of 
the trial court previously entered in this matter. 
Dated this z#& ay of June -34, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
&yjg*^/ 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
~ n r\ *> 
CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
Attorney for Defendant 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: 485-8123 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHROPE, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
vs. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant-Appellant « 
MOTION FOR STAY OF 
JAIL SENTENCE PENDING 
APPEAL 
No. 
District Ct. No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendant Jerry Osguthorpe pursuant to Rule 8 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure moves this Court for an order 
staying the imposition of a jail sentence upon Defendant for 
contempt of court until such time as this matter has been heard 
by this Court on appeal or, in the alternative, until a full 
hearing can be held concerning this Motion for Stay. 
This motion is based upon the following: 
1. An ongoing dispute for several years concerning the 
divorce and terms of divorce has occurred between the plaintiff 
and the defendant. 
2. As a result of this dispute Defendant has been ordered 
to pay a large amount of accrued child support and alimony to the 
plaintiff. 
3. In January of 1992 the lower court issued an order that 
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Defendant was to be incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail if 
he did not pay $5,000 toward these arrearages by January 13, 1992 
and to continue to pay the sum of $900 per month each month 
thereafter. 
4. On January 13, 1992 Defendant did pay to the plaintiff 
$5,000 which was obtained from Valley Bank & Trust Co. in the 
form of a loan signed by the defendant and his current wife. 
5. On May 18, 1992 a further hearing was held before the 
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson concerning the defendants failure 
to make payments in accordance with the Court's schedule. At 
that time the Court found Defendant in contempt of court and 
sentenced him to the Salt Lake County Jail for a period of thirty 
days "and such longer time as the Court deems fit to impose 
sentence" if the defendant did not pay an additional $2,000 by 
May 26, 1992 as well as continue to make the $900 per month 
payment as scheduled. 
6. During all of these proceedings Defendant has 
represented himself since he has been unable to afford counsel. 
7. Because of certain procedural irregularities the parties 
stipulated that the prior Order of May 18, 1992 could be vacated 
and that a new order executed on June 19, 1992 would take effect. 
Under the terms of this Order Defendant is ordered to be 
incarcerated in the Salt Lake County Jail for a period of thirty 
days and such longer time as the Court deems fit if the defendant 
is unable to pay $3,050 by June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon. 
8. The Affidavit of Defendant attached herein states that 
he is unable to meet this financial obligation because he does 
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not have the funds available to pay this amount under the Court's 
time table• Furthermore, the Affidavit of Defendant establishes 
that he is acting in good faith in attempting to settle this 
matter with his wife but that he is financially unable to meet 
the economic schedule established by the Court. Further, the 
Affidavit of Defendant together with supporting notarized 
statements of other veterinarians supports his position that he 
is not under-employed and is making a wage which is not 
inconsistent with other veterinarians doing his type of work in 
this depressed market. 
9. The attached Affidavit of Counsel Craig S. Cook is filed 
to support the reasoning as to why this request for stay on 
appeal has not first been formally made to the lower court. As 
stated in the Affidavit the lower court has imposed numerous 
contempt of court sentences upon the defendant and has issued 
stays based upon various events. In speaking with the lower 
court on June 19, 1992 the Court stated that it would be 
extremely unlikely to grant a stay on appeal unless some 
significant new evidence concerning Defendant's financial 
condition was presented to the Court. Since there is no new 
financial information that the Court has not already seen and 
rejected it is counsel's opinion that there is no likelihood that 
a stay pending appeal would be granted by the lower court. 
Moreover, the lower court is now sitting in Summit County during 
this week and is unavailable for a timely hearing. 
Based upon this motion, therefore, Defendant requests the 
following relief: (1) for a stay entered by a judge or judges of 
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this Court preventing the imposition of the incarceration that 
has now been ordered by the lower court as of June 24, 1992 at 
12:00 noon and continuing such stay until the appeal in this case 
has been decided by this Court; or (2) in the alternative, for an 
order issued by a judge or judges of this Court staying 
imposition of the jail sentence until such time as this matter 
concerning a stay on appeal may be fully argued to a panel of 
this Court• 
DATED this 24th day of June, 1992. 
alg f. j 
torney 
Cr i p.yCook 
At for Defendant-
Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Stay of Jail Sentence 
Pending Appeal to Sharon A. Donovan, Attorney for Plaintiff, 310 
South Main, Suite 1330, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 this 24th 
day of June, 1992• 
lo^Jad^ 
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CRAIG S. COOK, Bar No. 713 
Attorney for Defendant 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Telephone: 485-8123 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHROPE, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, AFFIDAVIT OF 
JERRY OSGUTHROPE 
vs. APPEAL 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, No. 
District Ct. No. 874904967 
Defendant-Appellant. Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
1. I am the defendant in the above-entitled case and have 
been involved in this continuing dispute with my former wife 
since our separation in 1988. The terms of my divorce have been 
before this Court on a previous occasion in Case No. 890219 
which was decided on March 19, 1990, 131 Utah Adv.Rpt. 21. 
2. I have been representing myself since this Court's 
decision on appeal because I have been financially unable to 
afford an attorney. On numerous occasions I have been found in 
contempt of the court for failure to make the required payments 
under the Divorce Decree but such jail sentence has been stayed 
pending my fulfillment of the financial obligation. 
3. In January of 1992 I again was ordered to go to jail 
unless I was able to provide $5,000 to my wife before January 13, 
1992. In order to meet this obligation my current wife and I 
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took out a loan from Valley Bank & Trust for $5,000 and paid her 
this amount prior to the imposition of the jail sentence. 
4. Since that time I have been making payments of $500 a 
month to my ex-wife the last one being on June 2, 1992 but these 
amounts are not sufficient to comply with the Court's Order of 
$1,050 a month which includes child support, alimony, and back 
payments. 
5. I have now been ordered to pay $3,050 to my ex-wife by 
June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon or to report to the Salt Lake County 
Jail. I have again attempted to borrow this money from Valley 
Bank but as evidenced by the attached letter of Nori Dustman, 
Assistant Vice President of Valley Bank, I am unable to obtain 
any further loans. 
6. During the hearing of May 18, 1992 and on previous 
occasions I have testified to the Court that I am presently 
making an adjusted gross income of approximately $14,000 as a 
contract veterinarian and that I simply am unable to meet the 
payment schedule created by the Court. I have attached notarized 
letters of three other veterinarians who support my contention 
that under the market in Salt Lake today that this is not an 
unreasonable wage and that I am not under-employed as continually 
alleged by my former wife and as found by the lower court. 
7. I have submitted to the Court copies of my recent 
federal tax returns which verify my income and my inability to 
meet these schedules. The Court has seemingly ignored these 
documents and has continued to impose a financial obligation upon 
me which I cannot meet. 
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8. I do not have any other assets or income available to 
meet this obligation of some $3,000 by today nor will I be able 
to meet the $1,050 obligation per month in the future• 
9. I presently, under the terms of the Divorce Decree, have 
all four of my children living with me and my current wife 
throughout the summer. It is therefore necessary for me to 
support them at home while at the same time paying my former wife 
for the child support and delinquent amounts even though they are 
not living with her during this three-month period• 
10. If I am forced to stay at the Salt Lake County Jail for 
thirty days or more as now ordered by the lower court I will lose 
any income that I could have earned during this period as a 
veterinarian as well as alienate many of my clients who I will be 
unable to service- In addition, my current wife and my four 
children will not have sufficient income available to support 
them during my incarceration. 
DATED this 24th day of June, 1992. 
J/ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the 24th day of June, 1992, personally appeared before me 
Jerry Osguthrope who duly acknowledged that the contents of the 
foregoing Affidavit are true and correct to the best of his 
knowledge and belief. 
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References in the shaded area are for Lender's use only and do not hmit the applicability of this document to any particular loan or item | 
Borrower: JERRY S. OSGUTHORPE 
GWENDA OSGUTHORPE 
4696 HIGHLAND OR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 64117-5135 
Lender: Valley Bank and Tnuit Company 
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June 22, 1992 
DR. JERRY OSGUTHORPE 
6808 COURTLAND AVENUE 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84121-0000 
Dear DR. OSGUTHORPE: 
In viewing your request, I am sorry to inform you that we 
will be unable to process your request. 
We feel that you have excessive obligations and insufficient 
income to support any further debt at this time. 
If circumstances should change in the future, we will be 
glad to re-evaluate your request. 
If you have any further questions, or would like to discuss 
this matter further, please feel free to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
NORI DUSTMAN 
ASSISTANT VICE PRESIDENT 
BROADWAY OFFICE 
(801)481-5350 
STATE OF UTAH 
A W Y rf<Uc^ >t« County of. 
appeared before me 'TY^ -w kCu^ttf-
Lua-s. 
» T > t ^ ^ T 
AD. B - £ - L personalty 
the signer 
of the within instrument, who duly acknowledged to me 
that v-> i> <• flvflmtArt ihe same, 
My commission expires: 
7 - - * 3JL 
r Notary Public 
Residing at 
3247 East 3300 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
(801) 485-6060 
J . Britt Hosken, D.V.M. 
6/23/92 
To Whom It May Concern, 
This will state that I pay a relief veterinarian 
$115.00 per day for a 9 hour shift. This veterinarian 
is an independent contractor who uses my staffs facili-
ties and supplies. 
The availability of jobs is a very limited market 
here in the Salt Lake area and competition among the 
various veterinary clinics is fierce keeping wages and 
salaries low for veterinarians and all staff. 
Sincerely, 
S5/)Y~^ 
J . B r i t t Hosken, D.V.M. 
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June 23, 1992 
5484 South 900 East 
Murray, Utah 84117 
(801) 266-1219 
To Whoir. I t Hay Cor.corr.: 
I curror.tr.- ' - i l l per,- ' 
r r » ^ " V n . T ^  ** S ^ - ~«V s* * 
assure r.a^CLcerl-I -y;- .mc; 
The daily rr.to o: ;-^ y :....t ; 
ard ability i:i 1:1:« : .:rct.\d 
c : ia«L Ci.'.i:lCa« ^ .^»-,— ww« 
'CS.CC-lCS.Ce per day for a full ti^e 
:r.clur:\--wly nnall ar.ir.al veterinary 
h - hour shift ard the doctor us- c. 
: I'Z^Z'. The doctor is e::pacted to 
.o;.nihilities \:hile ir. the practice* 
.3 i-isod o.-. their level of experience 
:• z\.i r.cnacer.er.t of a solo srr.all 
r.wlie:: '/or* :.o J:?.3C, 
of v:or:: car 3::/oct co have 
c:. ^ Icid. 
:1 a/.i a doctor performing this type 
r-orioCs of ti±e v;her. they are not 
YocSAyriA •£,„. 
->.- Hrj:t. * - • - -.6. / ? 
<7 f 
WHITC PINE VETERINARY CLINIC 
P.O. BOX 18U, PARK CITY. UTAH 14060 Telephone 801-649-7182 
801-32K657 
June 23, 1992 
Dear Sirs, 
This will state that I pay a relief veterinarian 
$110.00 per day for a 9 hour shift. This veterinarian 
is an independent contractor who uses my staff, facilities 
and supplies. 
Sincerely, 
k^actUf?. <$wdwM 
Keith S. Lund, DVM 
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SHARON A. DONOVAN, 0901 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-2167 
Telephone: 521-6383 
JUN1S1992 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER FINDING DEFENDANT 
IN CONTEMPT AND IMPOSING 
JAIL SENTENCE AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, attorneys' fees and 
immediate imposition of jail sentence came on regularly for 
hearing on May 18, 1992 before the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, 
one of the judges of the above-entitled Court, Plaintiff 
appearing in person and by and through Sharon A. Donovan on 
behalf of Kent M. Kasting, and Defendant appearing pro se, and 
the Court having heard evidence and during the proceedings having 
received documentary evidence regarding Defendant's income, 
Defendant's Exhibit Nos. 1 and 2. 
Pursuant to such hearing an Order was entered by the Court 
on June 5, 1992 finding the defendant in contempt and imposing a 
jail sentence and judgment. Because of procedural irregularities 
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the parties have stipulated that such Order should be withdrawn 
and that a new Order should t?: .ssued in Order to allow the 
defendant the opportunity e appropriate action with 
reference to such Order. 
The Court considers itself very familiar with the file of 
this case, having had numerous proceedings before this Court 
prior to the above-referenced hearing. The Court has carefully 
listened to the profer and evidence of the parties and reviewed 
prior testimony of the parties regarding prior imposition of jail 
sentence and considers itself fully advised in the premises. 
Based upon the foregoing, and the Court having made and entered 
adequate and sufficient Findings of Fact, now, therefore, the 
Court being fully advised, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUGED, AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. The Court finds that this matter has been before this 
Court before, has been up to the Court of Appeals on one occasion 
and that Court has sustained this Court, and the Court finds the 
defendant's income, as he states, is just not realistic. 
2. The Court finds that the parties9 children need to be 
supported and Defendant has failed to meet his obligations, 
pursuant to the Decree of Divorce. 
3. The Court sustains its previous order. The Court 
further orders that Defendant shall be incarcerated in the Salt 
Lake County Jail for a period of thirty days, and such longer 
time as the Court deems fit to impose sentence, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78-32-12, if the acts performed as ordered by 
this Court are not fully complied with. However, the Court will 
stay its imposition of jail sentence, as long as the following 
conditions are met: (a) the Court shall stay this Order until the 
June 24, 1992, at 12:00 noon, at which time $3,050.00 shall be 
paid by Defendant to Plaintiff to bring the delinquent child 
support and alimony through June 1992 ($1,800.00 in child support 
through June 1992, and alimony of $750.00 through June, 1992; and 
attorneys9 fees of $500.00 for purpose of these proceedings). If 
the the $3,050.00 is not paid by June 24, 1992 at 12:00 noon, a 
bench warrant shall issue, unless the defendant submits himself 
to the Salt Lake County Jail for incarceration. (b) The Court 
further orders that if the on-going child support and payment on 
arrearages of $900.00 per month due on the 5th day of July, 
1992 is not paid at that time, a bench warrant shall issue, 
unless Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the Salt Lake 
County Jail. (c) If Defendant submits himself voluntarily to the 
Salt Lake County Jail, he is ordered to inform this Court of 
such, so that the necessary paperwork can be taken care of. 43) 
Judgment shall enter against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff in 
the amount of $1,800.00 in delinquent child support through June 
1992; $750.00 in alimony through June 1992 and attorneys1 fees of 
$500.00 for purposes of these proceedings, for a total judgment 
of $3,050.00. 
DATED this 
12. 
day of June, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
/HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ District Judge 
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1 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS CONTINUED 
2 IN OPEN COURT:) 
3 THE COURT: LET ME INDICATE TO YOU THAT I'M NOT 
4 GOING TO GO BACK OVER WHAT I SAID THE LAST TIME, EXCEPT TO 
5 EMPHASIZE THAT THIS MATTER HAS ALREADY BEEN UP BEFORE THE 
6 COURT OF APPEALS ON ONE OCCASION, THAT THE COURT SUSTAINED 
7 THIS COURT, AND THAT THE COURT INDICATED THE SAME AS THIS 
8 COURT HAS, THAT THE DEFENDANT'S INCOME AS STATED BY HIM IS 
9 JUST NOT REALISTIC. 
10 THE COURT OF APPEALS TOOK THE POSITION THAT THE 
11 UNKNOWN AMOUNTS OF INCOME—THAT THERE WAS AN UNKNOWN AMOUNT OF 
12 INCOME THAT THIS COURT HAS TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, AND IT 
13 WAS JUSTIFIED IN DOING SO, AND NO MATTER HOW YOU LOOK AT IT, 
14 WE STILL HAVE CHILDREN THERE THAT DO NEED TO BE SUPPORTED. 
15 WE HAVE A MARRIAGE OF A CERTAIN DURATION WHERE 
16 ALIMONY HAS BEEN_AWARDED. AND IT HAS NOT BEEN-KEPT—UP-, 
17 ^^^ THIS COURT IS GOING TO SUSTAIN ITS ORDER PREVIOUSLY. 
18 /THE COURT IS GOING TO ORDER THAT THE DEFENDANT BE INCARCERATED 
ly IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL FOR A PERIOD OF 30 DAYS, AND SUCH 
20 LONGER TIME AS THE COURT SEES FIT TO IMPOSE PURSUANT TO 
i 
\1 78-32-12, IF THE ACTS ARE NOT PERFORMED AS ORDERED BY THIS 
22 \^COURT. 
23 THE COURT WOULD—NOW THIS AMOUNT YOU HAVE GIVEN ME 
24 IS THROUGH MAY? 
25 MS. DONOVAN: THAT'S CORRECT. 
Jt 
1 THE COURT: THE COURT WOULD STAY THE ORDER—ARE 
2 THOSE SUPPOSED TO BE PAID AT THE FIRST OF THE MONTH? 
3 MS. DONOVAN: THE 5TH AND THE 20TH, YOUR HONOR. 
4 THE COURT*. THE COURT WOULD STAY THIS ORDER UNTIL 
5 THE 26TH DAY OF MAY AT 12 O'CLOCK NOON, AT WHICH TIME $2,000 
6 SHALL BE PAID BY THE DEFENDANT, AND THAT WOULD INCLUDE 
7 BRINGING THE CHILD SUPPORT FOR MAY AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AND 
8 ALIMONY FOR MAY AND PROVISION FOR COMING BEFORE THIS COURT. 
9 AND EACH TIME THIS MATTER IS BROUGHT BACK, THERE ARE 
10 GOING TO BE ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY'S FEES, MR. OSGUTHORPE. YOU 
11 SHOULD UNDERSTAND THAT. AND THAT $2,000 IS TO BE PAID BY THE 
12 26TH BY 12 O'CLOCK NOON OR A BENCH WARRANT WOULD BE ISSUED, 
13 UNLESS THE DEFENDANT SUBMITS HIMSELF TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
14 JAIL FOR INCARCERATION. 
15 THE COURT WOULD FURTHER NOTE THAT IF THE AMOUNT DUE 
16 AND OWING ON THE 5TH OF JUNE IS NOT PAID BY THAT TIME—AND 
17 THAT AMOUNT WOULD BE HOW MUCH IS DUE? AND I'M SPEAKING OF 
18 EACH MONTH? 
19 MS. DONOVAN: $900 CHILD SUPPORT. THAT INCLUDES 
20 ARREARAGES. 
21 THE COURT: $900, IF THAT IS NOT PAID BY THE 5TH OF 
22 JUNE, A BENCH WARRANT WOULD BE ISSUED. 
23 THAT'S GIVING YOU AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING THIS 
24 CURRENT BY THE 26TH, AND THEN CURRENT THROUGH THE MONTH OF 
25 JUNE. AND IF IT'S NOT DONE, AS I SAY, A BENCH WARRANT WILL 
3 
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1 ISSUE, UNLESS YOU SUBMIT YOURSELF VOLUNTARILY TO THE COUNTY 
2 JAIL. 
3 I WOULD INDICATE TO YOU THAT IF YOU DO SUBMIT 
4 YOURSELF VOLUNTARILY, THAT YOU DO INFORM THIS COURT OF SUCH SO 
5 THAT THE NECESSARY PAPERWORK CAN BE TAKEN CARE OF. ANY 
6 QUESTIONS? 
7 THE DEFENDANT: WHERE AM I GOING TO COME UP WITH 
8 THIS INCOME, YOUR HONOR? 
1 THE COURT: MR. OSGUTHORPE, PAYMENT OF MONEY IS YOUR 
W RESPONSIBILITY WHICH HAS BEEN PLACED ON YOU BY THIS COURT AND 
l\ BY THE COURT OF APPEALS. AS I INDICATED TO YOU BEFORE, I'M 
12 NOT TELLING YOU WHAT TO DO. YOU ©0 WHAT YOU HAVE TO DO. 
13 BUT WHATEVER YOU DO, AS FAR AS ANY FURTHER APPEAL OR 
14 ANY MODIFICATION, THAT WOULD BE YOUR DECISION. 
15 THAT'S THE ORDER OF THE COURT. WOULD YOU PREPARE 
16 THE PLEADINGS? 
17 MS. DONOVAN: I WILL. 
18 THE COURT: AND GET THEM OVER TO ME AS SOON AS 
19 POSSIBLE, AND A COPY TO MR. OSGUTHORPE. ANY QUESTIONS 
20 CONCERNING THE ORDER? 
21 MS. DONOVAN: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
22 THE COURT: IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, THEN 
23 THAT WILL BE THE ORDER. FOR THE RECORD, LET ME ALSO INDICATE 
24 THAT THE COURT DOES ADMIT DEFENDANT'S EXHIBIT NOS. 1 AND 2. 
25 (WHEREUPON, THE PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 
3« 
KENT M. KASTING (1772) 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT IN RE: 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS, 
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF 
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC. 
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO 
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER, 
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF 
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR 
CONTEMPT CITATION 
Civil No. 874904967 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
oooOooo 
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written 
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt 
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and 
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for 
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on 
EXHIBIT "E" 
* * 
Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. The 
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m. The plaintiff was 
present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart, 
Adamson & Kasting. The defendant was present and represented 
himself pro se. The parties presented testimony and documentary 
evidence and argument in support of their respective positions. 
Each party was sworn and testified under oath. The Court 
reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents 
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the 
premises. The Court issued its ruling from the bench and has 
made Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. Based upon the 
foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER. Defendant's 
Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of 
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt 
Order and Sancrions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are 
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as 
proposed and without modification. 
2. DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991. Defendant's Rejection of 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is 
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except 
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she 
agreed to relinquish. 
2 
to 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE. Any personal property to be 
exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the 
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11, 1992. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present. 
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property 
to which he may be entitled. Following that exchange the issue 
of personal property shall be fully, finally and completely 
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal 
property. 
4. UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES. Plaintiff's 
claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred 
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to 
Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those 
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff 
has waived her right to seek reimbursement from defendant for the 
children's nedical and dental expenses from January 4, 1991 
through September 25, 1991, the date which she filed her motion 
seeking such reimbursement. 
5. JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. Plaintiff 
is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750, 
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid 
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January 
1992. This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for 
unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court. 
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES. Plaintiff is granted judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees. This 
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judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys 
fees previously entered by the Court. 
7. SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT. The Court imposes the following 
sanctions on defendant for his contempt: 
a. The defendant is fined $200. 
b. The defendant is ordered to serve 30 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail. 
c. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to 
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and 
ability to perform. He shall continue to serve the time in jail 
until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court. 
d. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code 
Annotated. (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion 
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community 
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual 
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance 
with the Court's Orders and the need to support his children, 
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so. 
e. The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a 
period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992. If by that time 
defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support 
arrearages reduced to judgment in ^5 above. If he fails to pay 
the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report 
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992. If 
A 
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he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued tor m & 
arrest. 
f. Further, in addition to and independent of the 
requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall 
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely 
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and 
$300 towards support arrearages). Should defendant not make 
these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail 
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence 
serving such sentence. This $900 monthly payment shall continue 
until all child support arrearages have been paid. It shall be 
in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to 
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce. 
g. Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has 
been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in 5s (e) 
and (f) above. 
DATED this X f day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
/HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
f D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
Date 
5 
Approved as to Substance and Form: 
.Q SA^/-
Kent M. Kastmg 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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KENT M. KASTING (1772) 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) 521-6383 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
JEANETTE CRAWFORD OSGUTHORPE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
JERRY SILVER OSGUTHORPE, 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The Hearing on Defendant's Objections to Plaintiff's Written 
Order and Judgements, Enforcement of Decree of Divorce, Contempt 
Order, Etc., Filed January 11, 1991 and Defendant's Objections to 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendations Related to Plaintiff's 
Verified Motion for Judgments, Contempt Order, Sanctions, and 
Other Relief Made October 8, 1991 and Plaintiff's Request for 
Contempt Citation came on for argument and evidentiary hearing on 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAV IN RE: 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S 
OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFF'S 
WRITTEN ORDER AND JUDGMENTS, 
ENFORCEMENT OF DECREE OF 
DIVORCE, CONTEMPT ORDER, ETC. 
FILED JANUARY 11, 1991 AND 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S # 
RECOMMENDATIONS RELATED TO .*\ 
PLAINTIFF'S VERIFIED MOTION 
FOR JUDGMENTS, CONTEMPT ORDER, /•'' 
SANCTIONS, AND OTHER RELIEF V '• 
MADE OCTOBER 8, 1991 AND •>/ ' 
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR • •*, 
CONTEMPT CITATION " ' 
Civil No. 874904967 .;"' '-'" 
J
 J 
t v 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson . ,J 
.i . i 
Tuesday, January 7, 1992, at the hour of 10:30 a.m. The 
proceedings concluded at the hour of 4:30 p.m. The plaintiff was 
present and represented by her counsel Kent M. Kasting of Dart, 
Adamson & Kasting. The defendant was present and represented 
himself pro se. The parties presented testimony and documentary 
evidence and argument in support of their respective positions. 
Each party was sworn and testified under oath. The Court 
reviewed the file, the pleadings, motions, and other documents 
before the Court and considers itself fully advised in the 
premises. The Court issued its ruling from the bench and now in 
connection with that ruling now makes the following Findings of 
Fact. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. NOTICE. Both parties had proper notice of these 
proceedings and the Court has jurisdiction over each of these 
parties. Defendant had the opportunity for a full hearing on 
Plaintiff's Request for Contempt. 
2. OBLIGATIONS UNDER DECREE OF DIVORCE. The defendant at 
all times knew and understood the obligations imposed upon him 
under 5s 4, 6, 7 and 15 of the Decree of Divorce entered in this 
matter. 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY. Disputes as to the exchanges of 
personal property have arisen between the parties in the past and 
those disputes have not been able to be voluntarily resolved by 
the parties. Any such disputes are independent from, and not 
related to, the defendants ongoing obligations to pay plaintiff 
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Plaintiff has in the past attempted to make arrangements for the 
orderly exchange of this property. 
4. UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES. The defendant 
has challenged plaintiff's claims for reimbursement of medical 
and dental expenses not covered by insurance. Those unreimbursed 
expenses through January 4, 1991 were reduced to judgment in 
connection with previous hearings held before the Commissioner 
and this Court. With regard to unreimbursed medical and dental 
expenses incurred after January 4, 1991 through September 25, 
1991, the date of the filing of plaintiff's last Motion, 
plaintiff stated she would not seek reimbursement from defendant 
for the same. 
5- UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. 
a. Defendant has failed to pay ongoing child support 
and alimony for considerable periods of time (See plaintiff's 
Exhibits 2, 3, 4 and 5). Between December 1990 and January 1992, 
plaintiff owed defendant $8,400 in child support, $2,100 in 
alimony (total $10,500 plus accrued interest). Defendant paid 
$750 leaving an unpaid arrearage of $9,750 (See plaintiff's 
Exhibit 5 and $750 owed for January, 1992.) No child support has 
been paid since February, 1991. 
b. Defendant and his current wife both testified "He 
would pay child support if his personal items were returned". 
c. Defendant further testified the plaintiff had 
plenty of money and could sell one of her houses. 
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d. Defendant has not demonstrated good faith in 
connection with attempting to pay his ongoing support 
obligations, 
e. Defendant testified he was paying his new wife $500 
per month rent in order to reside with her in a home she recently 
purchased at 6808 Courtland Circle, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
f. Defendant is a veterinarian practicing in excess of 
15 years and testified he earned $5.00 per hour in connection 
with consultation he claimed he provided to the Osguthorpe Animal 
Hospital. Defendant had and has the means to pay child support. 
g. The credibility of the defendant and his present 
wife is lacking. Both refused to answer questions on the stand. 
Both were evasive. The defendant did not answer questions 
truthfully. 
h. The defendant's failure to pay his support 
obligations as previously ordered was done willfully, voluntarily 
and with full knowledge of those obligations as previously 
ordered by the Court. 
6. CONTEMPT. The Court finds the defendant is in contempt 
of this Court pursuant to Section 78-32-1(5) Utah Code Annotated 
(1953, as amended), in that he has been disobedient of lawful 
jnr^gmca**^—orders and prot^s^^^^^Y^^TiTsHSbur^ The defendant had 
the opportunity to have a full hearing and evidence has been 
taken regarding that contempt. The defendant has not answered 
the questions put to him truthfully. The Court specifically 
finds that this is one of the most flagrant violations of the law 
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as far as support of children that has come before this Court, in 
that the defendant owes plaintiff in excess of $16,000 in unpaid 
child support alone. Defendant is further in contempt for his 
failure to pay alimony and attorneys fees as previously ordered 
by the Court. 
7. ATTORNEYS FEES. 
a. The defendant has paid nothing towards the 
attorneys fees he was previously ordered to pay by this Court in 
connection with the trial of this matter and his subsequent 
appeal of this Court's decision to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
b.
 t The plaintiff has incurred attorneys fees and costs 
in connection with this hearing and will be required to pay those 
fees. 
c. Plaintiff does not have the financial means to pay 
her fees. 
d. Plaintiff's counsel bills at the rate of $125 per 
hour. That rate is consistent with rates charged in the 
community for domestic relations work. Plaintiff's counsel 
expended in excess of 7 hours in connection with preparation for 
and attendance at the hearing. The rate charged and hours 
expended are reasonable and necessary. Plaintiff's counsel 
requested an award of $87 5 in attorneys fees. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the Court now makes the 
following: 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. OBJECTIONS TO JANUARY 1991 PROPOSED ORDER. Defendant's 
Objections to Plaintiff's Proposed Order and Judgments on 
Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment, Enforcement of Decree of 
Divorce, Determination of Attorneys Fees on Appeal, Contempt 
Order and Sanctions and Other Relief filed in January, 1991, are 
without merit and overruled and the Order has been signed as 
proposed and without modification. 
2. DEFENDANT'S REJECTION OF DOMESTIC COMMISSIONER'S 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF OCTOBER 8, 1991. Defendant's Rejection of 
Domestic Commissioner's Recommendation dated October 8, 1991 is 
denied and the Recommendation is affirmed in all respects, except 
as to plaintiff's claim for $180.53 in medical expenses which she 
agreed to relinquish. 
3. PERSONAL PROPERTY EXCHANGE. Any personal property to be 
exchanged under the original Decree of Divorce shall occur at the 
residence of the plaintiff at 12:00 noon on January 11# 1992. 
Plaintiff's counsel shall have a representative present. 
Defendant shall attend and secure possession of any such property 
to which he may be entitled. Following that exchange the issue 
of personal property shall be fully/ finally and completely 
resolved and neither shall raise any further claims to personal 
property. 
4. UNREIMBURSED MEDICAL AND DENTAL EXPENSES. Plaintiff's 
claims for unreimbursed medical and dental expenses incurred 
prior to January 4, 1991, have previously been reduced to 
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Judgment and, therefore, defendant's attempt to challenge those 
expenses is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Plaintiff by 
stipulation has waived her right to seek reimbursement from 
defendant for the children's medical and dental expenses from 
January 4, 1991 through September 25, 1991, the date which she 
filed her motion seeking such reimbursement. 
5. JUDGMENT - UNPAID CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY. Plaintiff 
is granted a judgment against defendant in the sum of $9,750, 
together with any accrued interest thereon, representing unpaid 
child support and alimony from December 1990 through January 
1992. This judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for 
unpaid child support and alimony previously entered by the Court. 
6. JUDGMENT - ATTORNEYS FEES. Plaintiff is granted judgment 
against defendant in the sum of $875 for attorneys fees. This 
judgment shall be in addition to prior judgments for attorneys 
fees previously entered by the Court. 
7. SANCTIONS FOR CONTEMPT. The Court imposes the following 
sanctions on defendant for his contempt: 
a. The defendant is fined $200. 
b. The defendant is ordered to serve 30 days in the 
Salt Lake County Jail. 
c. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12 Utah Code Annotated 
(1953 as amended), the imprisonment is for his omission to 
perform an act required by law, which he has the power and 
ability to perform. He shall r^ nntjnije to serve the time in jail 
until he pays the child support as ordered by the Court-
so 
d. Pursuant to Section 78-32-12.1(5) Utah Code 
Annotated, (1953 as amended), if the Court in its discretion 
finds that the defendant would benefit from performing community 
service, participating in workshop classes and/or individual 
counselling to educate him about the importance of compliance 
with the Court1s Orders and the need to support his children, 
then the Court may so order if it elects to do so. 
e. The jail sentence ordered above may be stayed for a 
period of 6 days or until January 13, 1992. If by that time 
defendant has paid to plaintiff $5,000 towards the child support 
arrearages reduced to judgment in 55 above. If he fails to pay 
the $5,000 by January 13, 1992, then the defendant is to report 
to the Salt Lake County Jail at 12:00 noon, January 14, 1992. If 
he does not so report, a bench warrant will be issued for his 
arrest. 
f. Further, in addition to and independent of the 
requirements in the preceding paragraph, the jail sentence shall 
be stayed, provided the defendant pay to plaintiff in a timely 
fashion the sum of $900 per month ($600 regular child support and 
$3 00 towards support arrearages). Should defendant not make 
these monthly payments as ordered, then the stay of the jail 
sentence shall be lifted and he shall immediately commence 
serving such sentence. This $900 monthly payment shall continue 
until all child support arrearages have been paid. It shall be 
in addition to the $150 monthly alimony payment he is required to 
pay plaintiff under the Decree of Divorce. 
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g. Defendant may purge himself of his contempt as has 
been found by the Court by paying the amounts required in fs (e) 
and (f) above. 
DATED this day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
HONORABLE HOMER F- WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to Substance and Form: 
a- XL***— Htsh 
-ft-^ Kent M.Hasting Date 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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1 THE COURT: WELL, YOU TAKE THE S375 THAT WAS 
2 PAID, AND OF COURSE NONE WAS PAID IN JANUARY, AND GOING BACK 
3 TO WHERE HE HADN'T PAID FULL CHILD SUPPORT BACK I GUESS TO 
4 ALMOST THE TIME OF THE DIVORCE, IT LOOKS LIKE BACK IN MARCH OF 
5 1969, THAT THERE IS AN AMOUNT OF CHILD SUPPORT--AND THIS WOULD 
6 HAVE TO BE DETERMINED ACCURATELY--BUT IT'S UP IN THE AMOUNT OF 
7 $16,000. 
8 NOW I'M NOT TALKING ABOUT ALIMONY OR ATTORNEYS 
9 FEES, I'M LOOKING ONLY AT CHILD SUPPORT, THAT HE'S HAD THE 
](> MEANS TO PAY THIS CHILD SUPPORT AND THAT HE HAS A GOOD 
11 EDUCATION, HE HAf. THE AE'.II.ITY TO, IF HE DOES NOT HAVE THE 
12 INCOME--AND THE COURT EVEN QUESTIONS THAT--THAT HE IS PAYING 
K'. FOR RENT IN AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT INSTEAD OF PAYING HIS CHILD 
1 4 SUPPORT. 
15 THE COURT FINDS THAT THIS IS ONE OF THE HOST 
16 FLAGRANT VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW AS FAR AS SUPPORT OF CHILDREN 
17 THAT HAS COME BEFORE THIS COURT, AND AS I SAY, I CANNOT EVEN 
18 COMPREHEND HOW A FATHER CAN ALLOW HIMSELF TO DO SUCH A THING 
19 AND STILL CLAIM HE LOVES HIS CHILDREN AND WANTS TO VISIT THE 
20 CHILDREN. 
21 THE COURT WOULD ORDER, PURSUANT TO SECTION 
22 70 32-10--AND OF COURSE I'VE INDICATED HE HAS BEEN FOUND II 
2?. CONTEMPT--THAT HE BE FINED 5200, AND THAT HE BE ORDERED TO 
i>9 SPEND 30 DAYS IN THE SAJLULAJCE COUNTY JAIL. 
2 5. THE COURT WOjJi^-F-URJHER ORDER, PURSUANT TO 
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SECTION 78-32-12 THAT THE IMPRISONMENT IS FOR HIS OMISSION TO 
PERFORM AN ACT ENJOINED BY LAW, WHICH HE IS YET IN THE POWER 
TO PAY, AND THAT AFTER SERVING THE 30 DAYS, HE IS TO CONTINUE 
TO SERVE THE TIME IN JAIL UNTIL HE PAYS THE CHILD SUPPORT AS 
ORDERED BY THE COURT. 
THE COURT WOULD FURTHER ORDER THAT THE COURT 
WILL RETAIN JURISDICTION OF THIS MATTER PURSUANT TO SECTION 
78-32-12.1(5), THAT IF THE COURT FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT--IF 
THE COURT, IN ITS DISCRETION, FINDS THAT THE DEFENDANT WOULD 
BENEFIT FROM PERFORMING COMMUNITY SERVICE, AND PARTICIPATE IN 
WORKSHOP CLASSES OR INDIVIDUAL COUNSELING TO EDUCATE HIM ABOUT 
THE IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE COURT'S ORDERS, AND TO 
PROVIDE HIS CHILDREN WITH A SUBSTANTIAL SOURCE OF SUPPORT, 
THEN THE COURT MAY ORDER THAT IF THE COURT SEES FIT. 
THE COURT WILL FURTHER ORDER THAT THE PRISON- -
OR, THE JAIL SENTENCE WILL BE STAYED FOR A PERIOD OF SIX DAYS 
OR UNTIL THE 13TH DAY OF JANUARY, 1992, THAT IF THE DEFENDANT, 
BY THAT TIME, HAS PAID THE SUM OF 55,000 TO THE PLAINTIFF FOR 
CHILD SUPPORT, THEN THE SENTENCE WILL BE STAYED AND EACH MONTH 
THEREAFTER THAT HE PAYS CHILD SUPPORT AS ORDERED BY THE COURT, 
PLUS THE SUM OF S300 TOWARDS THE ARREARAGE--OR FOR AN AMOUNT 
OF S900--THEN THE JAIL TERM WILL BE STAYED. 
IF HE FAILS TO PAY THE 55,000 BY THE 13TH DAY 
OF JANUARY, 1992, THEN HE IS TO REPORT TO THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
JAIL AT 12 O'CLOCK NOON. IF>ttr"EDES NOT REPORT, A BENCH 
WARRANT WILL BE ISSUED FOR HIS ARREST. 
I WOULD ASK THE PLAINTIFF TO PREPARING THE 
PLEADINGS. ANY OUESTIONS? 
MR. KASTING: NO, YOUR HONOR, AND I WILL. 
THE COURT: ANY OUESTIONS? 
MR. OSGUTHORPE: YES, YOUR HONOR. I'M A LITTLE 
CONFUSED ON THIS--HOW MUCH I HAVE TO PAY OR--. 
THE COURT: YOU HAVE TO PAY, BY JANUARY 13TH--
YOU HAVE TO PAY THAT BEFORE 12 O'CLOCK NOON. LET ME COUNT MY 
DAYS. 
MR. OiiGUTHORPE: PAY TO THE PLAINTIFF? 
THE COURT: WAIT A MINUTE. I HAVE GIVEN SIX 
DAYS, YOU HAVE TO PAY THAT TO THE PLAINTIFF BY THE 13TH, 
OTHERWISE REPORT TO THE JAIL ON JANUARY 14TH AT 12 O'CLOCK 
NOON OR A BENCH WARRANT WOULD BE ISSUED. 
MR. OSGUTHORPE: THEN $900 AFTER THAT? 
THE COURT: $900 A MONTH THEREAFTER. THAT 
WOULD BE $600 ONGOING CHILD SUPPORT AND $300 UNTIL THE 
ARREARAGE IN CHILD SUPPORT IS CAUGHT UP. 
AFTER THE ARREARAGE OF CHILD SUPPORT IS CAUGHT 
UP, THEN OK COURSE IT GOES BACK TO THE $600 A MONTH. OF 
COURSE IF THE CHILDREN BECOME OF AGE, THEN OF COURSE THAT'S 
SOMETHING, TOO. 
MR. KASTING: YOUR HONOR, WITH REGARD TO THE 
ONGOING ALIMONY OBLIGATION OF $150, THE SUPPORT OBLIGATION 
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1 WOULD BE 3750 A MONTH, S600 FOR CHILD SUPPORT--. 
2 THE COURT: THE ALIMONY WOULD HAVE TO BE PAID, 
3 TOO; I'M JUST NOT ORDERING THAT THAT BE PAID AS FAR AS THE 
4 JAIL. HE'S IN CONTEMPT OF THIS COURT AS FAR AS ALIMONY AND AS 
5 FAR AS THE OBLIGATION OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND ALL THE ORDERS OF 
6 THIS COURT; AND THAT SHOULD BE NOTED FOR THE RECORD. 
7 BUT I AM PURGING HIM OF THE CONTEMPT IF HE'S 
8 PAID THE CHILD SUPPORT AND GETS THE CHILD SUPPORT GOING, AND 
9 WHAT YOU DO AS FAR AS THE COLLECTION OF ALIMONY, I'LL HAVE TO 
10 LEAVE THAT TO YOU. 
11 MR. KASTING: OKAY, YOUR HONOfc. 
12 THE COURT: IF THERE ARE NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, 
13 COURT WILL BE IN RECESS. 
14 (WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 4:.35 P.M., THE 
15 PROCEEDINGS CAME TO A CLOSE.) 
16 
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20 (TRANSCRIBED BY NANCY BURR) 
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APPLICABLE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND 
STATUTES TO THIS APPEAL 
Amendment 5, United States Constitution: 
No person...shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of 
life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law.... 
Article 1, Section 7, Utah State Constitution: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law. 
Article 1, Section 12, Utah State Constitution: 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, to 
demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in 
which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall 
any accused person, before final judgment be compelled 
to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give 
evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled 
to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy 
for the same offense. 
Article 1, Section 16, Utah State Constitution: 
There shall be no imprisonment for debt except in 
cases of absconding debtors. 
Section 78-32-1, Utah Code Annotated: 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a 
court or proceeding therein are contempt of the 
authority of the court: 
* * * 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, 
order or process of the court. 
Section 78-32-3, Utah Code Annotated: 
...When contempt is not committed in the immediate 
view and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an 
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affidavit shall be presented to the court or judges of 
the fact constituting the contempt, or a statement of 
the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other 
judicial officers. 
Section 78-32-4, Utah Code Annotated: 
...When the contempt is not committed in the 
immediate view and presence of the court or judge a 
warrant of attachment may be issued to bring the person 
charged to answer, or, without a previous arrest, a 
warrant of commitment may, upon notice, or upon an order 
to show cause, be granted; and no warrant of commitment 
can be issued without such previous attachment to 
answer, or such notice or order to show cause. 
Section 78-32-9, Utah Code Annotated: 
When the person arrested has been brought up or has 
appeared the court or judge must proceed to investigate 
the charge, and must hear any answer which the person 
arrested may make to the same, and may examine witnesses 
for or against him; for which an adjournment may be had 
from time to time, if necessary. 
Section 78-32-10, Utah Code Annotated: 
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court shall 
determine whether the person proceeded against is guilty 
of the contempt charge. If the court finds the person 
is guilty of the contempt, the court may impose a fine 
not exceeding $200, order the person imprisoned in the 
county jail not exceeding 30 days, or order both fine 
and imprisonment.... 
Section 78-32-11, Utah Code Annotated: 
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action 
or special proceeding, prejudicial to his rights 
therein, is caused by the contempt, the court,, in 
addition to the fine or imprisonment imposed for the 
contempt or in place thereof, may order the person 
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of 
money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his 
costs and expenses; which order and the acceptance of 
money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved 
party for such loss and injury. 
Section 78-32-12, Utah Code Annotated: 
When the contempt consists in the omission to 
perform an act enjoined by law, which is yet in the 
power of the person to perform, he may be imprisoned 
until he shall perform it, or until released by the 
court, and in such case the act must be specified in the 
warrant of commitment. 
